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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN ARKANSAS: A PROGRESSIVE STATE

J. Lyn Entrikin*
“Arkansas has a rich and compelling tradition of protecting individual
privacy. . . . [A] fundamental right to privacy is implicit in the Arkansas
Constitution.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Summarizing Arkansas privacy law just two decades ago, Professor
John Watkins observed that caller ID services, electronic eavesdropping
devices, and CD-ROM files of computerized personal information all posed
significant risks to Arkansans’ privacy interests.2 Twenty years later, a proliferation of technological advances enables invasions of privacy by various
means, including data mining, social media, internet search engines, spyware, and online identity theft.3 The stakes have never been higher for state
laws protecting the civil right of privacy.
Today, privacy law in the United States amounts to an increasingly
complex patchwork of state and federal provisions.4 With respect to informational privacy, United States law is an example of the sectoral approach
to regulation, which layers discrete state and federal constitutional and statutory privacy protections over a backdrop of state common law rules largely
drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.5 A sectoral approach to in* Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock. The author expresses appreciation to the William H. Bowen School of Law for
providing research support, and to Cassandra Howell for soliciting the Article and for outstanding work as Teaching Assistant from 2011 to 2013. The author also thanks Riley Graber
for superb research assistance. Finally, the author acknowledges Max Entrikin for inspiring a
lifelong fascination with the right of privacy and for exemplifying the values associated with
its protection.
1. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 349–50 (2001), quoted with
approval in Ark. Dept. Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 10, 380 S.W.3d 429, 435.
2. John J. Watkins, The Privacy Tort: An Arkansas Guide, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 91, 91
(1993).
3. See, e.g., Rodolfo Ramirez, Online Impersonation: A New Forum for Crime on the
Internet, 27 CRIM. JUST. 6 (Summer 2012).
4. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904 (2009).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977); see Schwartz, supra note
4, at 932 (“The classic example of an ALI process for improving state law is the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which sets out Prosser’s privacy torts and heavily influences state law.”);
see also id. at 922 (“Overall, the approach in the United States to information privacy law in
the private sector has been through sector-specific laws containing FIP’s [fair information
practices], which have been enacted by federal and state lawmakers.”).
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formational privacy rights regulates a narrow range of privacy interests, as
opposed to an “omnibus” law, which offers general standards that govern
when no sectoral law unambiguously applies.6 On the other hand, autonomous privacy, the right to make decisions free from governmental interference regarding one’s intimate and family relationships, is protected to a
greater or lesser extent by federal and state constitutions as interpreted by
the courts.
Constitutional privacy jurisprudence reflects the substantial change in
social norms relating to privacy interests over the last twenty years.7 To a
limited extent, federal constitutional law acknowledges a substantive right
of autonomous privacy, not only with respect to parenting8 and reproductive
decisions,9 but also conduct within non-marital, consensual sexual relationships.10 Numerous federal and state statutes recognize sectoral privacy
rights,11 including the extensive privacy protection of personal health information guaranteed by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA).12 At the same time, state and federal Freedom of Information Acts allow broad public access to government information.13 Yet
6. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 905.
7. E.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 641, 80 S.W.3d 332, 356 (2002) (Brown, J.,
concurring) (“Societal mores change. . . . The unmistakable trend, both nationally and in
Arkansas, is to curb government intrusions at the threshold of one's door and most definitely
at the threshold of one's bedroom.”).
8. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000).
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating, as a violation of the Due
Process Clause, a Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate sexual conduct between two
persons of the same sex), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
The case . . . involve[s] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean
their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. . . . The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
11. An example of a federal sectoral privacy statute is the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998, which governs the use of personal information about children on the
internet. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 924.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). For a summary of its key provisions,
see OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE (May 2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. “A major purpose of the Privacy Rule is to
define and limit the circumstances in which an individual’s protected hea[l]th information
may be used or disclosed by covered entities.” Id. at 4.
13. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101 to -109 (Repl. 2002
& Supp. 2011).
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even those statutes offer important exceptions that recognize the need to
balance the right of public access against the privacy rights of government
officials and Arkansas residents whose personal information may be at risk
of disclosure in public records.14
Both state and federal courts have recognized a right of privacy with
respect to private consensual adult relationships.15 But these implied privacy
rights clash with statutory and state constitutional provisions that restrict
who may marry. For example, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage
Act in 1996.16 One section of the Act, generally known as DOMA, defines
“marriage” for purposes of federal law to mean only “a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife.”17 Further, DOMA expressly
authorizes states to disregard same-sex relationships legally recognized as
marriages by other states, as well as any rights or claims arising from those
same-sex relationships.18 The United States Supreme Court recently held
that by defining “marriage” for purposes of federal law to exclude same-sex
marriages presently recognized under the laws of eleven states and the District of Columbia, section 3 of DOMA violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.19 While the Court deferred to the States to decide in
the first instance whether same-sex marriages are valid, the Court’s decision
will no doubt lead the Arkansas Supreme Court to revisit the dimensions of
the state constitutional right of privacy.
In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court joined a small group of other
state supreme courts that have interpreted their respective state constitutions
to provide a civil right of privacy against government intrusion,20 independ14. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (excepting “personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(12) (Supp. 2011) (excepting “[p]ersonnel records
to the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”); see also McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 230, 766 S.W.2d 909,
914 (1989) (balancing plaintiff’s constitutional privacy interests against public’s interest in
open access to criminal investigation records).
15. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80
S.W.3d 332, 350 (2002).
16. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), invalidated in part by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2695 (2013).
17. 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; see also Ark. Const.
amend. 83, § 1 (“Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.”).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
19. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. In a related case, the Court dismissed for lack of
standing an appeal from a declaratory judgment that California Proposition 8, which refuses
recognition of same-sex marriages, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660, 2668 (2013).
20. See generally Jeffrey A. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law,
37 RUTGERS L. J. 971, 1002–07 (2006) (citing cases). In 1987, for example, the Texas Supreme Court recognized an implied state constitutional right to privacy in striking down a
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ent of any interstitial right of privacy implied in the United States Constitution.21 Relying on the state’s fundamental right of privacy, the court held
that the Arkansas constitutional right “protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults.”22 In 2011, the Arkansas
Supreme Court cited the state constitutional right of familial privacy23 in

state agency policy requiring employees to take polygraph tests. Tex. Employees Union v.
Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. 1987). Also
in 1987, the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted its state constitutional provision barring
intrusions into “private affairs” to preclude interference with the individual right of autonomy
to terminate life support. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987). In 1992, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that its state constitution implicitly granted a fundamental
right to privacy independent of any rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that right to privacy encompasses
procreational autonomy, thus protecting former husband’s right to object to former wife’s
proposed donation of frozen embryos to childless couple). These developments in interpreting state constitutions occurred at a time when the United States Supreme Court was becoming increasingly conservative and notably less inclined to expansively interpret the federal
Constitution.
21. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (2002) (“[A] fundamental
right to privacy is implicit in the Arkansas Constitution.”). As the Arkansas Supreme Court
acknowledged, the Arkansas Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy. Id.
at 624, 626, 80 S.W.3d at 345, 346. Unlike the Arkansas Constitution, a few other states’
constitutions have been amended to expressly grant a right of privacy. Shaman, supra note
20, at 974–75 (listing Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, and Montana); see also Jegley, 349
Ark. at 626, 80 S.W.3d at 346; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L.
REV. 477, 483 & n.25 (2006). For a thoughtful and comprehensive history of the Arkansas
Constitution and its amendment and interpretation, see Jerald A. Sharum, Note, Arkansas’s
Tradition of Popular Constitutional Activism and the Ascendancy of the Arkansas Supreme
Court, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33 (2009). As Sharum has observed, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has taken an increasingly active role in interpreting the state constitution to
confer civil rights broader in scope than those protected by the United States Constitution,
perhaps triggered by Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001). Sharum, supra, at 80. In
Sullivan, the Court reversed a holding of the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreting the United
States Constitution to provide more generous protections against pretextual searches than had
the U.S. Supreme Court. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772. But the Court explicitly held that state
courts may interpret their own state constitutions to do so. See id. On remand, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reached the same result it had before, but this time by interpreting the Arkansas Constitution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures more generously
than the counterpart protections in the Fourth Amendment. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647,
657–58, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (2002).
22. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350 (striking down the Arkansas sodomy
statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997) (current version at § 5-14-122 (Supp.
2011)), as applied to private, consensual, noncommercial, same-sex sodomy); see also Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, at 11–12, 388 S.W.2d 429, 436 (reversing conviction of high
school teacher for engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with an 18-year-old student as
violating defendant’s constitutional right of privacy).
23. See Ark. Dep’t. of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 26, 380 S.W.3d 429,
443.
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striking down a statute, enacted by initiative in 2008,24 that would have
barred individuals from adopting or serving as foster parents if living with a
sexual partner outside a marriage relationship recognized as valid under
Arkansas law.25 Yet the court has not decided whether the privacy protections recognized as implicit in the Arkansas Constitution extend to informational privacy.
This Article outlines Arkansas’s civil right of privacy as it stands in
2013. Compared to the civil and constitutional privacy protections of many
other states, Arkansas’s privacy law for the most part is quite progressive.26
But while the Arkansas Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the state
constitution to grant a fundamental right of privacy to Arkansans, the constitutional right protects against intrusions only by government agencies and
officials. Over the last two decades, the Arkansas General Assembly has
enacted a number of sectoral statutes that sanction privacy invasions by specific means such as spyware and phishing.27 But the enforcement of criminal
privacy statutes largely depends upon the discretion of state and local prosecutors. These statutory efforts to protect privacy, however well meaning, are
unlikely to have much effect because of limited government resources and
the political priorities of elected prosecutors.
For all of these reasons, Arkansas common law, which offers civil
remedies against privacy invasions by non-governmental entities, remains
an important source of privacy protection. As this Article will explain, state
common law privacy rights have evolved substantially since 1962 when the
Arkansas Supreme Court first implicitly recognized a cause of action for
invasion of privacy by misappropriation of one’s likeness.28 Yet several issues remain unresolved, including the scope of the privacy protection the
court has found implicit in the Arkansas Constitution.
This Article synthesizes legal authority defining the Arkansas civil
right of privacy and identifies issues yet to be resolved. Part I provides a
brief overview of the fascinating history of privacy law in the United
States.29 Part II addresses the evolution of the common law right of privacy
24. Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act, commonly known as “Act 1” (approved
Nov. 4, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-301 to -305 (Repl.
2009), invalidated by Cole, 2011 Ark. at 26, 380 S.W.3d at 443).
25. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 26, 380 S.W.3d at 443 (holding ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-301 to 305 unconstitutional).
26. An exception is the Arkansas Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cannady v. St.
Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d ___. See infra notes 361–96 and
accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-111-103 (Repl. 2011).
28. See Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962)
(dicta).
29. This section is largely drawn from J. Lyn Entrikin, The Right to Be Let Alone: The
Kansas Right of Privacy, 53 WASHBURN L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2014).
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in Arkansas beginning as early as 1909, as well as the state constitutional
right of privacy first acknowledged in Jegley v. Picado.30 Part III details the
elements of each of the four iterations of the Arkansas common law right of
privacy as interpreted by state and federal courts. Part IV identifies issues
related to the Arkansas right of privacy that the courts have not yet fully
resolved, including the extent to which Arkansas law recognizes a private
cause of action for invasion of privacy as an alternative means of enforcing
criminal statutes implicating privacy interests. Part V concludes.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Not often does a law review article lead the way for United States
courts to recognize a novel legal right that was unrecognized at common
law.31 The earliest cases debating the existence of the personal right of privacy were a direct outgrowth of an 1890 article co-authored by two law
partners and published in the law review of their alma mater.32 The trigger
for the article was the proliferation of news media commentary on the social
events of the day, facilitated by invasive new technologies.33
By the close of the nineteenth century, photography had become ubiquitous in the United States.34 George Eastman patented the Kodak box camera on September 4, 1888, making photography accessible to the general

30. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
31. RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 57, 63 (2010); see
FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED
RIGHT 61–62 (2009) (“‘The Right to Privacy’ was that rarest of law review articles: a treatise
so well reasoned and so compellingly argued that it helped to reshape American legal theory.”). While most American states have judicially recognized the right of privacy, “other
common law jurisdictions languish in a quagmire of indecision and hesitancy.” WACKS,
supra, at 63. Underscoring the increasing worldwide interest in privacy rights is the Great
Britain controversy about reporters employed by now-defunct News of the World hacking
into the voice mail of cell phone users. See James Poniewozik, The Humbling of Rupert Murdoch, TIME MAG., Aug. 8, 2011, at 32. See generally ABA PRIVACY & COMPUTER CRIME
COMM., INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004).
32. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890); see also Benjamin C. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right of Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy,” 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002); Amy Gajda,
What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press
Coverage That Led to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 36.
33. JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 5 (2008) (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 32); see also Bratman, supra note 32, at 626; Gajda, supra note 32, at 59–60. See generally MILLS, supra, at 29–35 (describing evolution of increasingly intrusive technology and
resulting challenges for protection of personal privacy).
34. See Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991).
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public.35 The portable Kodak
K
camera enabled surreptitious photography,36
triggering legal actions foor violating “the right of circulating portraits.”37
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and his former
l partner, future Supreme Court Justice Louis D.
law
B
Brandeis,
co-authored an article calling for a new
c
cause
of action for invasion of privacy.38 The motiv
vation
for the article may have been “a series of
a
articles
in a Boston high-society gossip magazine,
d
describing
Warren’s swanky dinner parties.”39 In
t age of “yellow journalism,” the co-authors fathe
m
mously
observed, “[T]he protection afforded to
t
thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions, expressed
t
through
the medium of writing or of the arts, so far
a it consists in preventing publication, is merely an
as
i
instance
of the enforcement of the more general
r
right
of the individual to be let alone.”40
During the next deccade, New York trial courts issued a series of decisions enjoining defendaants from publishing photographs of individuals
without their consent.41 But in 1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
35. MICHAEL S. MALONE, THE GUARDIAN OF ALL THINGS: THE EPIC STORY OF HUMAN
MEMORY 187–88 (2012). Easstman also originated the advertising slogan, “You Push the
Button, We Do the Rest.” The Brownie camera, introduced in 1901 and advertised to sell for
$1.00, was enormously popularr. Id.
36. Dorothy J. Glancy, Prrivacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 401, 409–17
(1990) (describing uncontestedd 1890 injunction secured by renowned comic opera star Marion Manola barring theater maanager from distributing flash photographs taken during her
performance); see Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 789 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1891) (reciting
facts from Manola v. Stevens & Myers (unpublished) decided by the same court in 1890),
Gen. Term 1892).
aff’d, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. G
37. Warren & Brandeis, su
upra note 32, at 196.
38. Id.
1, at 53; see William L. Prosser, The Right of Privacy, 48 CAL.
39. WACKS, supra note 31
L. REV. 383, 383 (1960).
s
note 32, at 205. Warren and Brandeis drew from Profes40. Warren & Brandeis, supra
sor Thomas Cooley’s treatise,, first published in 1878, which sketched the outlines of the
general right of “personal imm
munity” that would later become known more specifically as the
right of privacy. Id. “The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immuniM COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
ty; to be let alone." THOMAS M.
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
O CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888) (emphasis added), quoted in
Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 99–100, 109 (R.I. 1909) (declining to judicially recoggislative action); see also Barber v. Time, 159 SW.2d 291, 294
nize right of privacy absent leg
(Mo. 1942) (“The basis of the right
r
of privacy is the right to be let alone.” (citing THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY
OF CONTRACT 444, § 135 (4th. ed. 1934))).
41. E.g., Marks v. Jaffa, 226 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (Super. Ct. Spec. Term 1893) (enjoining
defendant newspaper editor fro
om publishing photograph of plaintiff actor-law student without
his consent); Mackenzie v. Sooden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240, 240 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
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Box,42 a deeply divided New York Court of Appeals reversed a judgment
awarding money damages to Abigail Roberson, an eighteen-year-old whose
photograph had been displayed without her consent on 25,000 advertising
posters for baking flour.43 The court’s refusal to recognize a cause of action
drew criticism from across the country.44 In response to the public outcry,
the 1903 New York Legislature hastily enacted a statutory right to privacy,
narrowly framed to provide a civil remedy for those whose names or likenesses have been appropriated for trade or advertising purposes without
their written consent.45
Like New York, other state appellate courts declined to recognize a
common law right to privacy, instead deferring the issue to their respective
state legislatures.46 A few states followed suit, enacting legislation similar to
New York’s.47 But several other states, by judicial declaration, recognized a
more sweeping right to privacy.

Co. 1891) (granting continuing injunction barring use of plaintiff’s name and endorsement on
defendants’ advertising). But cf. Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S.
271, 271–72 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.) (declining to enjoin unauthorized distribution of photos of
plaintiff’s infant daughter absent claim to vindicate property rights belonging to plaintiff),
aff’d, 31 N.Y.S. 17 (N.Y.C. & Co. Comm. Pleas Ct. 1894); see Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E.
22, 26 (N.Y. 1895) (declining to enjoin defendants from erecting statue of plaintiffs’ decedent, a private philanthropist, on grounds that subject of alleged privacy invasion was deceased); see also Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 288 (Mich. 1899) (“We
are not satisfied that . . . one has a right of action either for damages or to restrain the possessor of a camera from taking a snap shot at the passer-by for his own uses.”). Note that the
earliest recognition of the right of privacy was by courts sitting in equity. See generally Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, 64 N.E 442, 444–47 (N.Y. 1902).
42. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (4-3 opinion) (holding that New York does not recognize
common law right of privacy), rev’g 71 N.Y.S. 876 (App. Div. 1901). But see N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 51 (enacted 1903) (recognizing civil right of privacy for using one’s name or
likeness, without written consent, for trade or advertising purposes).
43. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442. For a fascinating and humorous account of the aftermath
of this decision for Ms. Roberson and Chief Judge Parker, who authored the decision (and
later ran for public office), see Daniel J. Kornstein, The Roberson Privacy Controversy, The
Historical Soc’y of the Courts of the State of N.Y. (Issue 4, 2006), at 3, available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/pdf/ HSNLVol.4.pdf; see also LANE, supra note 31, at
64–70 (discussing Roberson controversy).
44. Bratman, supra note 32, at 641, 648–50.
45. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009); see N.Y. LAWS 1903, ch. 132, § 2.
The companion criminal statute, § 50, defines the conduct as a misdemeanor. N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009); see N.Y. LAWS 1903, ch. 132, § 1. Section 51 creates a
private cause of action for a violation of the criminal statute.
46. E.g., Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 99–100, 109 (R.I. 1909) (declining to
judicially recognize right of privacy absent legislative action); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 75
N.W.2d 925, 927 (Wis. 1956) (declining to judicially recognize the right because state legislature had recently failed to enact bills that would have done so).
47. Bratman, supra note 32, at 641 (citing Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1354 n.90). Examples are Virginia (enacted 1904) and Utah
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The first to do so was Georgia. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,48 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a plaintiff had stated a
claim against an insurance company for printing his photograph in a newspaper advertisement without his consent.49 In recognizing a civil remedy for
invasion of privacy, the court drew from natural law principles, state and
federal constitutional protection of individual liberty interests, and a Georgia
statute authorizing any court to “ frame’” a remedy, if necessary, for a violation of any right within its jurisdiction.50 In the end, the Georgia Supreme
Court boldly (and accurately) predicted that one day the right of privacy
would be generally recognized in the United States:
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper
limits . . . the right of privacy, and that the publication of one's picture
without his consent by another as an advertisement, for the mere purpose
of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this
right, that we venture to predict that the day will come that the American
bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of
eminence and ability . . . .51

After Pavesich, other state and federal courts adopted varied perspectives on the question.52 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, following the
New York Court of Appeals, rejected the common law right of privacy in
1909, noting it was “unable to discover the existence of the right of privacy
contended for.”53 That same year, the Arkansas Supreme Court first
acknowledged54 but then narrowly sidestepped the issue in an action challenging the use of photographs of two criminal detainees in a “rogues’ gal(enacted 1909). See Note, The Virginia “Right of Privacy” Statute, 38 VA. L. REV. 117, 117
(1952).
48. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
49. Id. at 80–81.
50. Id. at 69–70 (quoting Ga. Civ. Code § 4929 (1895)).
51. Id. at 80–81; see DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 1:1, at 1-7 (2002) (nearly all
jurisdictions recognize right of privacy).
52. See, e.g., Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 108 (R.I. 1909) (refusing to judicially
recognize right of privacy, following Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y.
1902)); Hillman v. Star Publ’g Co., 117 P. 594, 596 (Wash. 1911) (rejecting right of privacy
absent legislation outlining parameters). But see, e.g., Pritchett v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Knox
Cnty., 85 N.E. 32, 35 (Ind. App. 1908) (following Pavesich); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,
120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. App. 1909) (following Pavesich); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076,
1080 (Mo. App. 1911) (following Pavesich).
53. Henry, 73 A. at 109.
54. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 551, 117 S.W. 746, 747 (1909) (dissolving temporary restraining order prohibiting federal officers from using photographs of arrestees solely
to identify them in various localities where federal offenses charged were allegedly committed). “The complaint . . . present[s] an interesting question concerning what is now termed by
modern authorities the ‘right of privacy,’ or the right of an individual to . . . restrain an improper use of his photograph without his consent.” Id., 117 S.W. at 747.
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lery.”55 On the merits, the court declared that law enforcement officers’ use
of detainees’ photographs solely for identification purposes was not improper.56 Thus, it declined to address whether Arkansas would recognize a common law right of privacy in other contexts.
In 1911, the Missouri Court of Appeals, relying on Pavesich, recognized a five-year-old boy’s common law cause of action against a Kansas
City jewelry store for using his image in a newspaper advertisement without
consent.57 Just a year later, a federal district court, also in Missouri, pointedly declined to resolve “the irreconcilable conflict of opinions and views of
courts of last resort in various jurisdictions.”58 The court posited that even if
a right of privacy did exist, it would surely not extend to a public educational institution seeking to enjoin a biscuit company from using the college’s name and emblems for commercial purposes.59 Thus, Vassar
College was denied an injunction prohibiting the marketing of “Vassar
Chocolates” in packaging that displayed knock-offs of the college seal, pennant, and motto.60
In 1939, the American Law Institute (ALI) recognized the evolving
common law right of privacy in the first version of the Restatement of
Torts.61 The Restatement outlined a single common law cause of action for
invasion of privacy based on two alternatives: first, disclosing another person’s private affairs to others; and second, exhibiting another’s likeness to
the public.62 To recover, a plaintiff was required to establish not only that
the invasion was an unreasonable and serious interference with the plain55. Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 81, 122 S.W. 115, 115–16 (1909) (declining to
address alleged common law right of privacy in action to enjoin publication of arrestees’
photographs in “rogues’ gallery” absent allegation of use by law enforcement officers for
purposes other than identification).
56. Id., 122 S.W. at 115.
57. Munden, 134 S.W. at 1077. “If a man has a right to his own image as made to appear
by his picture, it cannot be appropriated by another against his consent.” Id. at 1078.
58. Vassar Coll. v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982, 985 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (bill in
equity).
59. See id. at 984–85. The federal district court distinguished cases involving private
persons suing for invasion of privacy, observing that a public corporate institution depends
on publicity to fulfill its role as an institution of higher education. “Where a person is a public
character, the right of privacy disappears.” Id. at 985 (citing Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57
F. 434 (D. Mass. 1893)); see id. at 994. Today, the common law right of privacy is generally
considered a personal right that does not apply to corporations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652I cmt. a (1977); see also West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640,
648 (Tenn. 2001) (right to privacy cannot attach to corporations or other business entities).
60. Vassar Coll., 197 F. at 984–85.
61. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). “A person who unreasonably and seriously
interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other.” Id.
62. Id.
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tiff’s privacy interests, but also that the defendant should have foreseen that
the plaintiff would justifiably feel “seriously hurt” by the challenged conduct.63 Having met these requirements, the plaintiff was not required to
prove either physical harm or pecuniary loss to recover damages.64
Almost from the beginning, state courts citing the Restatement provision recognized privacy invasions that went beyond the essential elements
outlined by the ALI. For example, in 1941 the Oregon Supreme Court recognized an invasion of privacy when an optical corporation, without consent, signed the plaintiff’s name to a telegram urging the Governor to veto a
bill that would have prohibited corporations from dispensing optical glasses.65 While the facts involved neither disclosure of the plaintiff’s private
affairs to the public nor the exhibition of the plaintiff’s likeness, the court
nevertheless recognized a right of privacy that was invaded when the defendant “appropriated . . . for [its] own purposes . . . [plaintiff’s] name, his
personality, and whatever [political] influence he may have possessed.”66
In 1960, Dean William Prosser published an influential law review article acknowledging four related but distinct aspects of the common law
right of privacy.67 Prosser’s proposed formulation included (1) intrusion on
seclusion, solitude, or private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts; (3) publicity casting plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
and (4) appropriation of name or likeness for the defendant’s advantage.68
Each of the four privacy torts protects related but distinct privacy interests.69
63. Id. § 867 cmt. d.
[L]iability exists only if the defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only
where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues.
These limits are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who has never
manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the public, or where photographs of a person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously taken and published. . . . It is only when the defendant should know that the plaintiff would be
justified in feeling seriously hurt by the conduct that a cause of action exists. If
these conditions exist, however, the fact that the plaintiff suffered neither pecuniary loss nor physical harm is unimportant.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438, 439–40 (Or. 1941).
66. Id. at 448.
67. Prosser, supra note 39, at 383.
68. Id. at 389.
69. For a concise but accurate delineation of the differences among them, see Williams
v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 658, 669 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
Intrusion and disclosure require the invasion of something secret, secluded or
private; false light and appropriation do not. Disclosure and false light depend
upon publicity while intrusion and appropriation do not. False light requires falsity or fiction while none of the other three do. Appropriation requires a use for
defendant's advantage while the other three do not.
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Soon after publication of Dean Prosser’s article, the Arkansas Supreme
Court acknowledged a narrow common law right of privacy for the first
time when a photography corporation used the plaintiff’s studio photographs
for advertising purposes without her consent.70 Citing Prosser’s seminal article at the end of a footnote along with several other secondary authorities
addressing the right of privacy, the court implicitly recognized the tort he
had classified as appropriation of likeness for the defendant’s advantage.71
Fifteen years after the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the
common law right of privacy in Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd,72 the ALI
adopted Dean Prosser’s formulation of the four privacy torts in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.73 Since then, the great majority of states, including
Arkansas,74 have adopted all or most of the four distinct causes of action
outlined by Dean Prosser in 1960.75
III. EVOLUTION OF THE ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Although the point is seldom emphasized in the cases, each variation of
the common law right of privacy recognized in Arkansas is an intentional
tort.76 Because intent is an essential element of the claim, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted intentionally. To establish intent, Arkansas law requires more than proof that the
Id.
70. Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962)
(dicta).
71. Id. at 497 n.1, 353 S.W.2d at 23 n.1. Olan Mills has been cited numerous times as
the first case in which the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the common law right of
privacy. E.g., HOWARD W. BRILL & CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES §
33:11, at 639 (5th ed. 2004). However, the defendant in that case did not dispute either the
invasion of privacy or plaintiff’s lack of consent. Olan Mills, 234 Ark. at 497, 353 S.W.2d at
23. Rather, the defendant appealed only the $2,500 award of damages, arguing the plaintiff
could not recover for mental anguish alone in the absence of physical injury. Id. at 498, 353
S.W.2d at 24. The court rejected the argument, analogizing the facts to cases in which the
court had upheld damages for mental suffering and humiliation caused by wanton or willful
conduct without accompanying physical injury. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24 (citations omitted).
Olan Mills admitted that it had customarily secured written consent before using customers’
portraits for advertising purposes, but had failed to do so in this case. Therefore, the court
simply concluded that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24.
72. 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962) (dicta).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977).
74. See Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 638 n.8, 590 S.W.2d 840, 845 n.8
(1979).
75. ELDER, supra note 51, § 1:1. The sole exceptions are Wyoming and North Dakota.
Id. But cf. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (narrowly recognizing only misappropriation of name or likeness for trade or advertising purposes).
76. See, e.g., Smith v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 867, 872 (W.D. Ark.
1985) (dicta) (most forms of invasion of privacy require intent as an element).
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defendant intended to do the act that in turn caused the harm.77 The plaintiff
must show that the defendant believed the tortious results were substantially
certain to follow from defendant’s conduct.78 In other words, the tortious
harm not only must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant; the
injury also must have been subjectively foreseen by the defendant to support
liability.
Moreover, a plaintiff who files a privacy claim in state court must satisfy Arkansas pleading requirements to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Arkansas is a fact pleading state and does not recognize
notice pleading.79 In alleging violation of the right of privacy, a claimant
must, at minimum, specifically identify the nature of the privacy claim asserted.80
A.

Common Law Right of Privacy

While the Arkansas Supreme Court gave an approving nod to the development of the common law right of privacy in other states as early as
1909,81 it was a relative latecomer in fully recognizing the cause of action
grounded in Arkansas common law. In 1957, in Webber v. Gray,82 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld an injunction against a jilted paramour who
77. See Talley v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 274, 620 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1981)
(declining to adopt “tort concept that one intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of
his acts” for purposes of construing insurance policy exclusion for results of intentional conduct); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (defining “intent”).
78. Under Arkansas law, “intentional torts involve consequences which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow his actions.” Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458,
460, 692 S.W.2d 615, 617 (1985), cited with approval in Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark.
115, 123, 226 S.W.3d 800, 808 (2006); cf. Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 719–20, 945
S.W.2d 933, 935–36 (1997) (for employee to file tort action against employer for damages in
lieu of workers’ compensation, employer must have had “desire” to bring about consequences of acts, or must have premeditated the tortious acts with specific intent to injure; intentional torts involve consequences the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from the
actions (citing Miller, 286 Ark. at 461–62, 692 S.W.2d at 617–18)).
79. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 8; see also Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 7, 678 S.W.2d 361,
363 (1984) (“Simply because the complaint said that the action was one for ‘invasion of
privacy’ would not make it so; we must look to the alleged facts.” (citing Bankston v. Pulaski
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 281 Ark. 476, 665 S.W.2d 859 (1984))); cf. Steinbuch v. Hachette Book
Grp., No. 4:08CV00456 JLH, 2009 WL 963588, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2009) (dismissing
false light claim for failing to “make any specific allegations as to how the book casts him in
a false light”).
80. See Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 264, 937 S.W.2d 653, 657 (1997) (refusing to develop privacy claim for plaintiffs, who failed to identify which privacy theory applied and cited no authority to support alleged invasion of privacy).
81. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 552, 117 S.W. 746, 747 (1909); see Mabry v.
Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 83, 122 S.W. 115, 115 (1909); see also Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v.
Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 498, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962) (dicta).
82. 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957).
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had repeatedly harassed the plaintiff over several years.83 While the allegations might have supported a common law cause of action for what is now
commonly known as intrusion on seclusion,84 the complaint sounded in equity and failed to raise the right of privacy as the basis for a common law
claim.85 While sitting in equity, the court’s reasoning was nevertheless consistent with the policies underlying recognition of the common law right of
privacy.86
In Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict awarding damages to a woman whose photograph had
been used without her consent to advertise the defendant’s photography
studio.87 The only dispute on appeal was whether the court would sustain the
83. Id. at 295–96, 307 S.W.2d at 84.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see also ARKANSAS MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013).
85. As a general rule, an equitable remedy is not available unless the plaintiff lacks a
complete legal remedy. Townsend v. Ark. State Hwy. Comm’n, 326 Ark. 731, 734, 933
S.W.2d 389, 391 (1994); McGehee v. Mid South Gas Co., 235 Ark. 50, 55, 357 S.W.2d 282,
286 (1962). In Webber, because the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the injunction in substantial part, the court implicitly held that no common law right of privacy existed in Arkansas at that time. See Webber, 228 Ark. at 295–96, 307 S.W.2d at 84 (“He has no remedy at
law against the almost incessant harassment which the record discloses he has been subjected
to over a period of years.”).
86. See Webber, 228 Ark. at 293, 307 S.W.2d at 82–83.
For several years appellant has written numerous letters and notes to appellee
in an effort to force him to renew their association. These notes and letters,
signed and unsigned, were delivered by mail and by the appellant leaving them
in or upon appellee's automobile, his residence and place of business. Similar letters have been written by appellant to appellee's mother, wife, employer and the
real estate company from which appellee purchased his home and, in which, appellant states that appellee is the father of her unborn child and is soon to be
faced with a paternity suit. Appellee estimated that he had received at least 200
such communications within a year prior to the last hearing.
[A]ppellant caused a picture of herself and the announcement of their approaching marriage to be published in a local newspaper. [S]he made written application for a marriage license in their names . . . without his knowledge or consent. Almost daily appellant accosts appellee on the streets in an attempt to engage him in conversation. Since appellee’s marriage . . . , appellant has followed
appellee and his wife to town in her car nearly every work day and left a note or
letter in or upon his car when he refused to talk to her. On numerous occasions
she has parked her car within a few feet of appellee's home for long periods. The
telephone at appellee's home rings frequently when the caller merely ‘hangs up’
upon answer being made.
Id. at 292, 307 S.W.2d at 82. Upholding the injunction even though the rights implicated
were not property rights, the court concluded, “The acts of the appellant . . . might be classed
as trivial if they had been merely sporadic or of short duration. But appellee has the right to
pursue his lawful daily occupation and family activities unhampered by the protracted molestations of the appellant . . . .” Id. at 293, 307 S.W.2d at 84.
87. 234 Ark. 495, 498–99, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1962).
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award of damages for emotional distress alone in the absence of physical
injury.88 The court did not address the privacy claim on its merits because
the defendant conceded that the plaintiff had established the elements of
invasion of privacy; the only issue in dispute was the amount of damages
awarded.89 Nevertheless, Olan Mills has been cited repeatedly by the Arkansas appellate courts as the first case in which the common law right of privacy was recognized.
Not until 1979 did the court explicitly adopt the four common law privacy actions as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Dodrill v.
Arkansas Democrat Co.,90 the court upheld summary judgment granted to
the news publisher in a case filed by an attorney plaintiff for defamation and
invasion of privacy.91 In a previous action, the attorney had been suspended
from the practice of law, subject to readmission if he successfully sat for the
Arkansas bar exam.92 After retaking the exam and passing it, he alleged that
the defendant newspaper erroneously reported that he had failed the exam.93
Before affirming summary judgment on the merits, the Arkansas Supreme
Court expressly adopted the four privacy torts as “codified” in the Restatement.94
Since 1979, the Arkansas courts have repeatedly acknowledged the
four common law privacy torts as defined in the Restatement.95 After Olan
Mills, no cases involving appropriation of name or likeness have reached the
88. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24.
89. Id., 353 S.W.2d at 24.
90. 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979).
91. Id. at 637–38 & n.8, 590 S.W.2d at 844–45 & n.8.
92. Id. at 631, 590 S.W.2d at 841; see In re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549
(1976).
93. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 633, 590 S.W.2d at 842. The trial court granted summary judgment on both claims, reasoning that the attorney plaintiff was a public figure and that he
failed to show that the newspaper acted with actual malice. Id. at 633–34, 590 S.W.2d at 842.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed this holding on appeal. Id. at 639–40, 590 S.W.2d at
846.
94. Id. at 637–38, 590 S.W.2d at 844–45; see id. at 638 n.8, 590 S.W.2d at 845 n.8
(holding that “Arkansas has been included in [the] majority [of jurisdictions that recognize
the right of privacy] with the decision in Olan Mills . . . .”).
95. E.g., Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 263, 937 S.W.2d 653, 657 (1997) (citations omitted) (“Arkansas has recognized the existence of four actionable forms of invasion
of privacy . . . .”); CBM of Cent. Ark. v. Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 225–26, 623 S.W.2d 518,
519–20 (1981) (recognizing intrusion on seclusion); Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at
845 (recognizing false light publicity); see ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421
(Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (appropriation of name or likeness)
(citing Olan Mills Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962)); ARKANSAS
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422 (public disclosure of private facts); see also Wood v.
Nat’l Computer Sys., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Arkansas law) (publicity
given to private facts); Stanley v. Gen. Media Comm’ns, 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706–07 (W.D.
Ark. 2001) (appropriation of likeness; false light).
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Arkansas appellate courts. Intrusion on seclusion and false light publicity
appear to be the privacy torts most often litigated in Arkansas appellate
courts.96 While the state courts have not addressed a claim for publicity given to private facts, the federal courts have done so on occasion.97 Part III
addresses each of the four privacy torts in more detail.
B.

Constitutional Right of Privacy

The underpinnings of the Arkansas Constitution’s right of privacy were
recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court as early as 1924 in Coker v. City
of Fort Smith.98 A city ordinance prohibiting prostitution also prohibited any
male over the age of fourteen from accompanying, day or night, “‘without
there being any necessity therefor . . . any woman known or generally reputed to be a prostitute or lewd woman.’”99 Coker was convicted of a misdemeanor and fined for violating the statute, and he appealed, challenging its
constitutionality.100 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the ordinance
went too far by effectively denying a prostitute the value of residing in the
city by denying the privileges that “give that right its value.”101 While the
ordinance did not directly prohibit a prostitute from accompanying a male in
the city, it effectively denied her that right by criminalizing the conduct of
her male companion.102
Coker did not expressly rely on the Arkansas Constitution as the basis
for invalidating the Fort Smith ordinance. The court simply held that the
relevant portion of the ordinance was “too broad in its terms, and was beyond the power of the [city] council to enact, and [was] therefore invalid.”103
The court reasoned, however, that the ordinance limited the liberty interests
of “lewd” women as well as their male companions,104 directly implicating
what would later become known as the “right to be let alone.” Further, the
96. See, e.g., Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d
___ (intrusion on seclusion); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634
(2002) (intrusion on seclusion, false light); Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361
(1984) (intrusion on seclusion); Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (intrusion on seclusion); Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (false light); Coombs v. J.B. Hunt Transp.,
Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 24, 388 S.W.3d 456 (2012) (intrusion on seclusion); Addington v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003) (intrusion on seclusion, false
light).
97. See Wood, 814 F.2d 544; Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, 446 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 2011).
98. 162 Ark. 567, 258 S.W. 388 (1924).
99. Id. at 568–69, 258 S.W. at 389 (quoting Fort Smith city ordinance).
100. Id., 258 S.W. at 389.
101. Id. at 573, 258 S.W. at 390.
102. Id., 258 S.W. at 390.
103. Id., 258 S.W. at 390.
104. Coker, 162 Ark. at 573, 258 S.W. at 390.
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court cited two cases from Texas and Missouri, each of which had struck
down similar enactments on state and federal constitutional grounds.105
In 1973 in Carter v. State,106 the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed
the constitutional privacy issue more directly. The appellants challenged the
constitutionality of the Arkansas criminal sodomy statute107 on multiple
grounds. They had been convicted for engaging in intimate conduct in a
vehicle parked at a public rest stop and tourist information facility, within
view of others who had parked trucks, automobiles, and campers there.108
The appellants’ main argument was that the statute violated their right of
privacy under various amendments to the United States Constitution.109
The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to strike down the statute, observing that it carried a strong presumption of constitutionality.110 Moreover,
the presumption of validity was “enhanced by the highly persuasive fact that
the [criminal sodomy] statute was long unassailed.”111 The court emphasized
that the defendants’ conduct leading to the conviction occurred not in private, but in a public place.112 The appellants unsuccessfully cited cases that
“demonstrate[d] . . . the expansion of the ‘right to privacy in matters of intimate personal preference’ . . . based upon the courts’ having taken cognizance of dramatic changes in social conditions which have made legal doctrines once appropriate become unsuited for contemporary society.”113 The
court avoided the issue by deferring to the legislative branch, observing that
“[i]f social changes have rendered our sodomy statutes unsuitable to the
society in which we now live, we need not be concerned about the matter

105. Id. at 571–72, 258 S.W. at 390; see Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628, 629 (Mo. 1896)
(“We deny the power of any legislative body in this country to choose for our citizens whom
their associates shall be.”); Ex parte Cannon, 250 S.W. 429, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923)
(“[T]he various subdivisions of section 2 of this ordinance . . . demonstrate that it is violative
of the fundamental guaranty of both the federal and state Constitutions to every citizen of life,
liberty, and property.”).
106. 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973).
107. ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-813 (Repl. 1964), invalidated by Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark.
600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
108. Carter, 255 Ark. at 227, 500 S.W.2d at 370.
109. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370.
110. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370.
111. Id. at 228, 500 S.W.2d at 370 (citations omitted). “[I]f such a statute were in violation of federal constitutional principles, surely the thought would have long since occurred to
the many legal scholars and jurists of this state. Appellants have not, by their multifaceted
attack, met their very heavy burden of showing that this statute is unconstitutional.” Id., 500
S.W.2d at 370.
112. Id., 500 S.W.2d at 370. The court could have avoided the constitutional issue entirely simply by holding that even if the appellants did have a right of privacy, they had waived it
by virtue of engaging in prohibited conduct in a public place in view of others.
113. Id. at 230, 500 S.W.2d at 371.
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because there is a branch of our government within whose purview the making of appropriate adjustment and changes peculiarly lies.”114
Five years later in 1978, the court addressed the constitutional rights of
arrestees in Bolden v. State.115 The appellants argued in part that they were
prejudiced because the prosecution had failed to comply with Rule 8.1 of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “[a]n arrested
person who is not released by citation or by other lawful manner shall be
taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.”116 The court
agreed with the appellants’ argument that Rule 8.1 was mandatory, but disagreed that the State’s failure to comply warranted dismissal of the charges.117 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged in passing that the rule was designed in part to protect arrestees’ privacy and liberty interests, which are
among the fundamental constitutional rights of arrestees protected by both
the state and federal constitutions.118
A decade later, a divided court addressed asserted constitutional privacy interests with respect to public records in McCambridge v. City of Little
Rock.119 The case involved certain records and photographs associated with
the 1987 murder-suicide of John Markle, the son of Mercedes
McCambridge, then a well-known actress.120 McCambridge and the Markle
estate sued the City and its police department in an effort to prevent the release of information as to which McCambridge claimed a constitutional
right of privacy.121 The trial court held that the challenged records were subject to disclosure under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.122 On

114. Carter, 255 Ark. at 230, 500 S.W.2d at 371.
115. 262 Ark. 718, 723–24, 561 S.W.2d 281, 284 (1978).
116. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.1.
117. Bolden, 262 Ark. at 724, 561 S.W.2d at 284.
118. Id., 561 S.W.2d at 284. As the court observed,
Rule 8.1 is designed and has as its purpose to afford an arrestee protection
against unfounded invasion of liberty and privacy. Moreover, the person under
arrest taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay will have the
charges explained, will be advised of his constitutional rights and will have
counsel appointed for him, if an indigent, and arrangements for bail can be made
expeditiously. Such action may avoid the loss of the suspect's job and eliminate
the prospect of the loss of income and the disruption and impairment of his family relationship. Indeed, these are basic and fundamental rights which our state
and federal constitutions secure to every arrestee. Hence, we conclude that Rule
8.1 is mandatory in its scope.
Id., 561 S.W.2d at 284 (emphasis added).
119. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989).
120. Id. at 224–25, 766 S.W.2d at 911; see Archive of Obituary of Mercedes
McCambridge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/18/arts
/mercedes-mccambridge-87-actress-known-for-strong-roles.html.
121. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 224–25, 766 S.W.2d at 911.
122. Id. at 225, 766 S.W.2d at 911.
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appeal, McCambridge argued in part that releasing the records would
amount to a violation of her constitutional right of privacy.123
Relying on recent United States Supreme Court decisions, the Arkansas
Supreme Court acknowledged that McCambridge had a valid privacy interest in at least some of the criminal investigation records.124 The court observed that fundamental privacy interests include the protection of family
relationships.125 Those interests were directly implicated in McCambridge
because one of the documents she sought to protect from disclosure was a
long letter her deceased son had written to her just before committing the
murder-suicide.126 However, the court reasoned that her constitutional privacy interest extended only to “personal matters,” defined as information that
a person has intentionally kept private, that could be kept private absent
governmental action, and that would be embarrassing to a reasonable person
if disclosed.127 Applying that standard to the facts, the court concluded that
some of the documents in question involved matters personal to
McCambridge.128
Having determined that McCambridge had a constitutional privacy interest in some of the documents, the court proceeded to balance her constitutional privacy interest against the government’s interest in public disclosure
recognized by the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.129 After considering each record one by one, the court concluded that the balance weighed in
the government’s favor, and therefore none of the records were exempt from
disclosure under the Act.130 The court acknowledged that McCambridge’s
privacy interest in the contents of the letter her son had written to her was
especially high, observing that “[w]hile public figures cannot expect the
same degree of privacy as private citizens, they can reasonably expect privacy in personal letters to or from their children.”131 Nevertheless, the government also had a strong interest in the letter’s content because it was relevant
123. Id. at 226, 766 S.W.2d at 912.
124. Id. at 228–30, 766 S.W.2d at 913–14 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600
(1977) (holding that one facet of constitutional privacy interests includes the right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public)).
125. Id. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914 (citing Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
458 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
126. Id. at 231–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
127. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914 (citing with approval Bruce E.
Falby, Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal Matter: Perfecting
Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEO. L.J. 219, 240
(1981)).
128. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 914. In particular, she had a privacy interest in two letters Markle
had written to his attorney, in Markle’s diary, in the letter Markle had written to her, and in
the photographs. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 914.
129. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458).
130. Id. at 231–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
131. Id. at 232, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
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to solving the crime.132 The court concluded that the government’s interest
in disclosure outweighed McCambridge’s privacy interests.133
McCambridge was an important case in the development of Arkansas
privacy law because it recognized, for the first time, evolving federal precedent recognizing a constitutional privacy interest in information regarding
intimate personal matters. The case also expressly acknowledged that the
right of privacy extends to family relationships.134 In citing Whalen v. Roe,135
the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged two basic aspects of constitutional privacy interests: informational privacy, the interest in avoiding disclosure of information pertaining to private matters; and personal autonomy,
“the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”136 The first of these was implicated in McCambridge; the second
would await direct recognition by the Arkansas Supreme Court thirteen
years later in Jegley v. Picado.137
The Arkansas Supreme Court once again addressed a constitutional argument pertaining to informational privacy in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Heath.138 Heath, a middle school principal, was the subject
of a report to the Department of Human Services alleging a possible incident
of child abuse for paddling a student.139 He challenged the report and ultimately obtained a ruling from the circuit court declaring that the report of
child abuse was “unsubstantiated.”140 While the Department did not appeal
that decision, it challenged the circuit court’s order directing it to remove the
report from the state’s Child Abuse and Neglect Central Registry.141
The challenge was based on a state statute142 that required the Department to expunge all unfounded reports from the registry after three years.143
The Department interpreted the statute’s affirmative mandate to mean that
expungement before three years was not discretionary but rather prohibited
as a matter of law.144 The issue on appeal was whether retaining the report in

132. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 915.
133. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 232, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
134. Id. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914.
135. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
136. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 229, 766 S.W.2d at 913 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at
599–600).
137. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
138. 312 Ark. 206, 848 S.W.2d 927 (1993).
139. Id. at 208, 848 S.W.2d at 928.
140. Id., 848 S.W.2d at 928.
141. Id. at 208–09, 848 S.W.2d at 928.
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-505 (Supp. 1991) (repealed 2009).
143. Id.
144. Heath, 312 Ark. at 209, 848 S.W.2d at 928.
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the state registry after the circuit court had found it unsubstantiated violated
Heath’s constitutional due process, equal protection, and privacy rights.145
First, after reviewing the legislative history, the Arkansas Supreme
Court agreed with the Department’s interpretation that the statute required
even unsubstantiated reports of child abuse to be retained in the registry for
three years.146 Nevertheless, the court held that the statute did not violate due
process because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that it implicated any
property interest, even after the court conceded that the registry information
may have been harmful to his professional reputation.147 The court also rejected Heath’s equal protection argument, concluding that the state had a
rational basis for classifying subjects of unsubstantiated reports of child
abuse differently than innocent persons who had never been accused of child
abuse.148
Finally, the court turned to the appellant’s privacy challenge. Considering the statutory safeguards that required the Department to flag unfounded
reports of child abuse and to restrict disclosure of the information,149 the
court held that no constitutional privacy interest was implicated by maintaining Heath’s name in the state registry.150 In reaching that conclusion, the
court cited United States Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedents upholding analogous government listings of data over privacy challenges.151
With this background, the Arkansas Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of the Arkansas criminal sodomy statute in 2002 in the watershed case Jegley v. Picado,152 which struck down the state’s criminal sodomy statute153 as applied to private adult consensual sexual relationships.154 A
group of gay and lesbian Arkansas citizens filed a declaratory judgment
145. Id., 848 S.W.2d at 928. The circuit court held in part that retaining the record in the
registry would violate Heath’s due process rights. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Heath, 307
Ark. 147, 148, 817 S.W.2d 885, 886 (1991). On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not
specify whether it resolved the issue on state or federal constitutional grounds. See Heath,
312 Ark. at 209, 848 S.W.2d at 928.
146. Heath, 312 Ark. at 209, 848 S.W.2d at 928.
147. Id. at 211–14, 848 S.W.2d at 929–31 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
148. Id. at 214, 848 S.W.2d at 931.
149. Id. at 215, 848 S.W.2d at 932 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-506 (Supp. 1991)
(repealed 2009)).
150. Id. at 215–16, 848 S.W.2d at 931–32.
151. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (declining to address privacy issue because challenged state statutory scheme evidenced proper concern with individual privacy
interests); Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1988) (observing that the “constitutional right to privacy is generally limited to only the most intimate aspects of human
affairs”).
152. 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2002).
153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997) (current version at § 5-14-122 (Supp.
2011)).
154. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 632, 638, 80 S.W.3d at 350, 354.
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action challenging the constitutionality of the statute.155 The court reviewed
the ongoing development of the federal right of privacy, observing that the
United States Supreme Court at that time had declined to recognize “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy”156 under the federal Constitution. Yet the court concluded that the Arkansas Constitution did protect
that right, holding that “the fundamental right to privacy implicit in our law
protects all private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults.”157 The court cited Coker in support of a broad reading of the
Arkansas Constitution to the extent of protecting a prostitute’s right to be
accompanied by a man within city limits.158 The court also reasoned that the
Arkansas Constitution requires the General Assembly to extend all privileges and immunities to all citizen classes alike.159
Jegley represented the Arkansas Supreme Court’s willingness to read
the Arkansas Constitution to provide greater privacy protections for personal
autonomy than did the United States Constitution, as then interpreted. In
2002, the United States Constitution’s zones of privacy had not yet been
interpreted to protect consensual private sexual activity by same-sex couples.160 Yet Jegley foreshadowed by just a year the United States Supreme
Court’s 2003 decision overruling its own precedent by holding that the
United States Constitution affords homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in consensual sexual activity.161
155. Id. at 608, 80 S.W.3d at 334.
156. Id. at 624, 80 S.W.3d at 344.
157. Id. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350 (Imber, J., writing for the majority). A concurring justice agreed but in narrower language: “I agree with the majority that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right under the Arkansas Constitution and that it is violated by enforcement of
the sodomy statute against consenting adults engaged in noncommercial sexual activity in the
bedroom of their homes.” Id. at 640, 80 S.W.3d at 355 (Brown, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). The distinction between all consensual sexual activity between adults and that occurring “in the bedroom of their homes” would later cause Justice Brown to dissent from a decision extending Jegley to protect consensual adult sexual activity outside a couple’s own bedroom. See infra notes 219–31 and accompanying text (discussing Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark.
127, 388 S.W.3d 429).
158. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 628, 80 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Coker v. City of Ft. Smith, 162
Ark. 567, 258 S.W. 388 (1924)).
159. See id., 80 S.W.3d at 347 (quoting ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 18).
160. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
161. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Th[is] case . . . involve[s] two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State [of Texas] cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime [of sodomy]. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government.
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As might be anticipated, Jegley has opened the door to a number of
other challenges to Arkansas statutes implicating the fundamental constitutional right of privacy recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court. These
cases raise important questions about the scope of the state constitutional
privacy right. In particular, it remains debatable whether the right applies
solely to decision making about intimate private consensual sexual activity
between adults in their own homes, or whether it reaches more broadly to
include informational privacy rights.
For example, in 2005, in Polston v. State,162 the court considered the
constitutional right of privacy of felons in the context of a statute authorizing DNA sampling.163 Under the State Convicted Offender DNA Database
Act,164 felons must submit to the taking of DNA samples for inclusion in the
State Convicted Offender DNA Database.165 Polston had been convicted on
guilty pleas to several drug-related offenses.166 The court first held that
mandatory DNA sampling was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, in particular because “a convicted person has a diminished
expectation of privacy in the penal context.”167 Also, the court reasoned that
the nature of the challenged intrusion was not substantial under United
States Supreme Court precedent.168 Given these considerations, the appellant’s privacy interests were outweighed by the state government’s substantial interest in collecting and maintaining DNA samples from convicted felons.169
The appellant, citing Jegley, also asserted that by collecting DNA samples from non-violent felons, the state violated his state constitutional right
of privacy, independent of any protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures.170 The court crisply dismissed the argument without elaboration, implicitly distinguishing Jegley as having implicated only the right to
intimate sexual activity in one’s own home.171

Id.
162. 360 Ark. 317, 201 S.W.3d 406 (2005).
163. Id., 201 S.W.3d 406.
164. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1101 to -1120 (Repl. 2009).
165. Id. §§ 12-121-1103(9) to -1109(a).
166. Polston, 360 Ark. at 322, 201 S.W.3d at 407.
167. Id. at 326, 201 S.W.3d at 410 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984)).
168. Id., 201 S.W.3d at 410–11 (citing, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985)).
169. Id. at 327, 201 S.W.3d at 411.
170. Id. at 331, 201 S.W.3d at 414.
171. Id. at 331–32, 201 S.W.3d at 414. “We fail to see how our precedents recognizing a
citizen's fundamental right to privacy in his or her home offer any support for Polston's argument that he, a convicted felon, has a fundamental right to privacy implicit in Arkansas law
that would exempt him from the DNA testing at issue in this case.” Id. at 332, 201 S.W.3d at
414.

462

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

A year later in 2006, a clergyman challenged the constitutionality of an
Arkansas criminal statute,172 contending that it infringed his constitutional
right of privacy.173 The statute in question in Talbert v. State174 prohibits
clergymen from using their positions of trust and authority to engage in sexual activity with another;175 the victim’s consent is not a defense.176 On appeal from his conviction, the clergyman argued that the statute infringed his
constitutional right to privacy under both the United States and Arkansas
Constitutions, citing Lawrence v. Texas177 and Jegley v. Picado respectively.178 As for the due process argument based on Lawrence, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the appellant had no constitutional right to abuse
his position of trust and authority as a clergyman to engage in unwanted
sexual activity with his victims.179 Turning to his claim based on the Arkansas Constitution, the court held that the statute did not infringe on the appellant’s constitutionally protected right to engage in “private, consensual sex,”
readily distinguishing Jegley on its facts.180
Also in 2006, in Department of Human Services & Child Welfare
Agency Review Board v. Howard, 181 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a
ruling declaring unconstitutional a regulation adopted in 1999 by the Child
Welfare Agency Review Board providing that “[n]o person may serve as a
foster parent if any adult member of that person's household is a homosexual.”182 On appeal by the State Department of Human Services, the Arkansas
Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that the regulation exceeded the
agency’s statutory authority and violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The court reasoned that the regulation failed to promote the health, safety, and welfare of children as required by the agency’s authorizing statute183
and “rather act[ed] to exclude a set of individuals from becoming foster parents based upon morality and bias.”184 The majority declined to address the
alternative constitutional arguments the plaintiffs had asserted to the circuit
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(B) (Repl. 2006) (current version at § 5-14126(a)(1)(C)). The statute prohibits “a member of the clergy [who] is in a position of trust or
authority over the victim [from using] the position of trust or authority to engage in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual activity.” Id.
173. Talbert v. State, 367 Ark. 262, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2006).
174. Id., 239 S.W.3d 504.
175. Id. at 265, 239 S.W.3d at 508 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(a)(1)(B)).
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126(b).
177. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
178. Talbert, 367 Ark. at 269–71, 239 S.W.3d at 511–12.
179. Id. at 270, 239 S.W.3d at 512.
180. Id., 239 S.W.3d at 512 (emphasis added).
181. 367 Ark. 55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006).
182. Howard, 367 Ark. at 58, 238 S.W.3d at 3.
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-405 (Supp. 2011).
184. Howard, 367 Ark. at 62, 238 S.W.3d at 6.
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court, including the argument that the regulation violated their state constitutional right of privacy, because those issues were not properly before the
court on appeal.185
Justice Brown concurred but wrote separately to emphasize that he
would have reached the privacy issue.186 Citing Jegley, Justice Brown reasoned that the challenged regulation “overtly and significantly burden[ed]
the privacy rights of couples engaged in sexual conduct in the bedroom
which . . . has [been] specifically declared to be impermissible as violative
of equal-protection and privacy rights.”187
There is no question but that gay and lesbian couples have had their
equal-protection and privacy rights truncated without any legitimate and
rational basis in the form of foster-child protection for doing so. Indeed,
in Jegley, this court held that privacy rights attending sexual conduct in
the bedroom between two consenting adults was a fundamental right under the Arkansas Constitution that required strict scrutiny and a compelling state interest to justify interference with it.188

As explained later, Justice Brown’s concurring opinion in Howard foreshadowed the court’s unanimous decision five years later in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Cole.189
The same year the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Talbert and Howard, the Eighth Circuit addressed the federal and state constitutional right of
privacy in Sylvester v. Fogley.190 A former Arkansas police officer alleged
that his superiors had violated his constitutional right of privacy under both
the United States and Arkansas Constitutions by investigating his consensual sexual relationship with a complaining witness.191 The officer had been
assigned to investigate a complaint by a married couple who believed one of
their employees had embezzled funds from their co-owned business.192 The
husband later complained to police superiors that the officer had engaged in
sexual relations with the complainant wife.193 After an investigation confirmed the complaint and revealed other indiscretions by the officer, he was
dismissed.194 He later sued, alleging that defendants’ investigation into his
consensual sexual relationship with the female complaining witness violated
185. Id. at 66, 238 S.W.3d at 8–9.
186. Id. at 66–70, 238 S.W.3d at 9–11 (Brown, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 68, 238 S.W.3d at 10 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332
(2002)).
188. Id. at 70, 238 S.W.3d at 11.
189. 2011 Ark. 145, 380 S.W.3d 429. See infra notes 203–17 and accompanying text.
190. 465 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2006).
191. Id. at 852.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 854–55.
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his constitutional right to privacy under both the United States and Arkansas
Constitutions.195
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment entered for the defendants,196 but declined to consider the substantive right of privacy on
which the officer’s claim was based.197 Nevertheless, the court expressed
pointed skepticism about the asserted constitutional privacy right, noting
that “‘[o]bscure’ might best describe the right of privacy.”198 The panel
acknowledged that the Arkansas Supreme Court had identified a fundamental state constitutional right of privacy in the context of private, noncommercial, consensual sexual relationships, and therefore strict scrutiny was
the appropriate judicial standard for reviewing an alleged government infringement.199 Assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff officer had such
a right, the court nevertheless held that the government had a compelling
interest in investigating allegations that his conduct had seriously compromised the embezzlement investigation.200 Furthermore, the court held that
the nature and scope of the investigation had been narrowly tailored to the
government’s compelling interest.201 Therefore, the government’s interest in
protecting the integrity of the criminal investigation and thus “administering
a fair and unbiased criminal-justice system” was compelling, and the investigation had been narrowly tailored to serve that interest.202
Next in the chronology came Cole,203 an important case that helped
clarify the boundaries of the state constitutional privacy right recognized in
Jegley v. Picado. In 2008, a majority of the voting electorate approved an
initiative enactment—the Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act of 2008

195. Id. at 852–55.
196. Fogley, 465 F.3d at 860.
197. The court acknowledged that “police officers generally have a right of privacy in
their private sexual relations.” Id. at 858 n.6 (citing cases from other circuits). But the court
also observed that the courts did not agree on the appropriate standard of constitutional review when those activities are investigated by police departments. Id.
198. Id. at 857.
199. Id. at 857–58 (citing Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350
(2002)). The court also observed that unlike the Arkansas Supreme Court in Jegley v. Picado,
the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas had implicitly applied a rational-basis
standard, suggesting that the constitutional right to engage in consensual homosexual sexual
conduct was not a fundamental right. Id. at 857 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
200. “First, we conclude that a police force has a compelling interest in precluding a
criminal investigator from having sexual relations with witnesses or victims involved in an
underlying criminal investigation.” Fogley, 465 F.3d at 859.
201. “Second, we conclude that the [Arkansas State Police’s] investigation of [the] allegations was narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest in administering a fair
and unbiased criminal-justice system.” Id. at 860.
202. Id.
203. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, 380 S.W.3d 429.
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or “Act I”—in the general election.204 The statute provided that no individual could adopt a child or serve as a foster parent in Arkansas if that person
were cohabiting in a sexual relationship outside a marriage considered valid
under Arkansas law.205 By its express terms, the statute applied both to cohabiting heterosexual couples as well as same-sex couples.206
The plaintiffs were unmarried adults who sought to become adoptive or
foster parents in Arkansas, as well as adult parents who wished to preserve
their right to determine who might adopt their children in the event of their
death.207 They challenged the statute’s constitutionality on various
grounds.208 The circuit court, following a hearing, agreed with the plaintiffs
and granted summary judgment on their argument that the statute violated
their due process, equal protection, and privacy rights under the Arkansas
Constitution.209 Specifically, the circuit court reasoned that the initiative
statute “‘significantly burden[ed] non-marital relationships and acts of sexual intimacy between adults because it force[d] them to choose between becoming a parent and having any meaningful type of intimate relationship
outside of marriage, [which] infringes upon the fundamental right to privacy
guaranteed to all citizens of Arkansas.’”210
On appeal by the state, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.211 First,
the court agreed that the statute burdened the plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional right to privacy, and therefore heightened scrutiny applied.212 The
court articulated that interest as prohibiting “[t]he intrusion by the State into
a couple’s bedroom to enforce a sexual prohibition.”213 Act I substantially
burdened the constitutionally protected interest in “engag[ing] in private,
consensual sexual conduct in the bedroom by foreclosing their eligibility to
foster or adopt children, should they choose to cohabit with their sexual
partner.”214 The court’s reasoning reflects that the state constitutional right
implicated was the right of personal autonomy to make decisions implicating relationship and familial interests.
Second, while the state asserted that the enactment sought to advance a
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of Arkansas children, the court
concluded that the initiative measure failed to use the least restrictive means

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 2, 380 S.W.3d at 431.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304(a) (Repl. 2009).
Id. § 9-8-304(b).
Cole, 2011 Ark. at 3, 380 S.W.3d at 432.
Id. at 4, 380 S.W.3d at 432.
Id. at 5–6, 380 S.W.3d at 432–33.
Id. at 6–7, 380 S.W.3d at 433 (quoting unpublished circuit court opinion).
Id. at 25–26, 380 S.W.3d at 442.
Id. at 21, 380 S.W.3d at 440.
Cole, 2011 Ark. at 18, 380 S.W.3d at 439.
Id., 380 S.W.3d at 439.
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to serve that interest because it categorically prohibited unmarried couples
from adopting or becoming foster parents.215
In deciding Cole, the unanimous majority opinion repeatedly referenced the constitutional privacy rights of cohabiting sexual partners, whether heterosexual or homosexual, to decide whether to become parents.216 The
constitutional challenge by the plaintiffs, who were all cohabiting partners,
would not have permitted the court to go further in its holding. Yet the opinion left open the question whether the court would extend the state constitutional privacy right beyond a cohabiting couple’s bedroom.217 That opportunity was presented recently in a criminal case involving a high school
teacher who had engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with an eighteen-year old high school student.218
A deeply divided court addressed the parameters of the state constitutional privacy right in Paschal v. State.219 Paschal appealed his convictions
for second-degree sexual assault and bribing a witness.220 He and an eighteen-year-old high school student had engaged in a consensual sexual relationship221 in violation of an Arkansas statute prohibiting a public schoolteacher from engaging in sexual contact with a student under age twentyone.222 A majority of the court affirmed his conviction for witness bribery
but reversed his convictions for sexual assault, reasoning that the criminal
statute was unconstitutional as applied because it criminalized private consensual sexual activity between adults and therefore infringed Paschal’s
fundamental right to privacy.223 The majority quoted directly from Jegley v.
Picado in defining the Arkansas constitutional right of privacy: “‘[T]he fundamental right to privacy implicit in our law protects all private, consensual,
noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults.’”224 The statute in
215. Id. at 21, 380 S.W.3d at 440.
216. Id. at 9–11, 14–15, 380 S.W.3d at 434–35, 437.
217. See id., 380 S.W.3d at 434–35, 437.
218. See Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429.
219. 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429 (4-3 opinion).
220. Id. at 1, 388 S.W.3d at 431.
221. The state did not dispute that the sexual relationship was consensual or that the student was an adult for the duration of the relationship. Id. at 8, 388 S.W.3d at 434; see ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-25-101(a) (Repl. 2009) (defining anyone age 18 to have reached the age of
majority for all purposes).
222. Paschal, 2012 Ark. at 8, 388 S.W.3d at 434 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14125(a)(6) (Supp. 2011)).
223. Id. at 14–15, 388 S.W.3d at 437 (Hannah, C.J., writing for the majority). Justice
Daniel wrote a separate opinion concurring with the majority opinion to the extent it reversed
the sexual assault convictions. However, he also would have reversed the conviction for
witness bribery for reasons beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 15–17, 388 S.W.3d at
438–39 (Danielson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 11, 388 S.W.3d at 435 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Jegley v.
Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350 (2002)).
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question made consensual sexual activity between these two adults a crime,
and therefore it could not survive constitutional challenge.225 The fact that
one was a high school teacher and the other an adult student was not relevant.
Three justices joined in two lengthy dissenting opinions.226 They interpreted Jegley v. Picado narrowly, reasoning that the state constitutional privacy right protects “the right . . . for consenting adults to have sexual relations in the privacy of their homes.”227 They also characterized as “absurd”
the majority’s interpretation of the Arkansas constitutional right of privacy
to extend to a teacher’s sexual contact with an eighteen-year-old student at a
school where the defendant taught.228 Analogizing to Talbert, the dissenting
justices reasoned that the teacher-student relationship is inherently fraught
with potential coercion because teachers hold a position of trust and authority that is subject to misuse.229 Under the circumstances, the dissenters reasoned that the statute did not implicate a fundamental constitutional right,
and therefore the court needed only a rational basis to uphold it.230 From the
dissenters’ perspective, the state had a legitimate interest in enacting a statute protecting schoolchildren from the problems inherently associated with
sexual conduct involving school employees, and the challenged statute was
rationally related to that interest.231
In Paschal, a bare majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted
the Arkansas fundamental constitutional right of privacy broadly enough to
protect any noncommercial sexual activity or conduct between consenting
adults. Over the objections of three justices, the majority declined to confine
the privacy right to the bedrooms of cohabiting adults, a rationale the court
had unanimously embraced in Cole in striking down Act I. Because the
court was so divided, Paschal raises unanswered questions about just how
225. Id. at 11–12, 388 S.W.3d at 436. The majority recognized the possibility that the
Arkansas General Assembly may have intended the statute to mean that a high school teacher
is inherently in a position of trust and authority over all students, even adults, but the court
observed that the legislature had not done so. Id. at 11, 388 S.W.3d at 436 (implicitly distinguishing Talbert v. State, 349 Ark. 600, 239 S.W.3d 504 (2002), in which the court upheld a
conviction of a clergyman who had engaged in unwanted sexual activity with two victims by
abusing his position of trust and authority).
226. Id. at 17–23, 388 S.W.3d at 439–42 (Brown, J., joined by Gunter & Baker, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also id. at 23–26, 388 S.W.3d at 442–43 (Baker,
J., joined by Brown & Gunter, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
227. Id. at 19, 388 S.W.3d at 440 (Brown, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(emphasis added) (citing Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 14, 380
S.W.3d 429, 437).
228. Paschal, 2012 Ark. at 24, 388 S.W.3d at 442 (Baker, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
229. Id. at 25–26, 388 S.W.3d at 443.
230. Id. at 26, 388 S.W.3d at 443.
231. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 443.
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far the court is willing to go in interpreting the fundamental right to privacy
protected by the Arkansas Constitution. To date, for example, the court has
not addressed the extent to which the state constitutional right extends to
informational privacy interests, or whether it protects personal autonomy
with respect to matters other than intimate sexual relationships and familial
interests.
IV. THE ARKANSAS COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY
As noted above, the Arkansas courts have generally recognized the
four variations on the common law right of privacy enumerated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section comprehensively addresses each
of the four privacy torts as developed by judicial interpretation of Arkansas
common law.
A.

Appropriation of Name or Likeness

The Arkansas Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to resolve
a disputed claim for appropriation of name or likeness on the merits. In Olan
Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, the plaintiff prevailed in a jury trial alleging the
unconsented use of her photograph for advertising purposes.232 On appeal,
the parties did not dispute the jury’s finding that Olan Mills had invaded the
plaintiff’s privacy, and the defendant conceded that she was entitled to nominal damages.233 But the court upheld a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff
$2,500 over the defendant’s objection that the law did not support compensatory damages for mental anguish in the absence of physical injury.234 The
Olan Mills court made a point of limiting its holding to the “particular facts
of [the] case and the extent of the damages . . . awarded.”235
Thus, the sole legal issue resolved by Olan Mills was the availability of
damages for mental anguish; the court had no occasion in that case to adopt
a common law right of privacy.236 A later decision by the Arkansas Supreme
Court would underscore this point and the central substantive question presented in Olan Mills.237 In 1980, the court suggested that the Olan Mills
court had strained to uphold the challenged award of damages on appeal,
even to the extent of recognizing an invasion of privacy as a subterfuge to
allow recovery for mental injury not accompanied by any physical injury,

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962).
Id. at 498–99, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 499, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 498, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
See id., 353 S.W.2d at 24.
See M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
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contrary to the traditional “impact” rule in Arkansas.238 The court observed
that Olan Mills had even “resorted to the right of privacy to support an
award” of damages for mental anguish, suggesting that the right of privacy
was merely a foil for avoiding the “constructive” physical impact Arkansas
courts had long required to support a damage award for mental distress
alone.239
The fact that the Arkansas appellate courts have never directly addressed a claim for appropriation of name or likeness on its merits means
that the federal courts have taken the lead in diversity cases to predict how
the state courts would rule on the issue. In doing so, the federal courts have
too narrowly interpreted Olan Mills in identifying the elements of a claim
for appropriation of name or likeness. The Arkansas Supreme Court has
repeatedly cited the Restatement in clarifying the elements of a privacy
claim. For the misappropriation tort, the elements required by the Restatement reflect the underlying basis for the claim: to remedy the mental anguish of a plaintiff whose name or likeness is used by a defendant for its
own advantage without the plaintiff’s permission. As explained in detail
below, the federal courts have unduly limited the claim to commercial uses
by the defendant, in the absence of any contrary holding by the Arkansas
courts.240
For example, in Stanley v. General Media Communications, Inc.,241 two
high school girls sued the publisher of Penthouse Magazine for publishing
their names and photograph alongside an article reporting the results of a

238. Id. at 274–77, 596 S.W.2d at 684–86.
239. Id. at 279, 596 S.W.2d at 687. Ultimately, the court squarely adopted the common
law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, thereby “abandon[ing] [its]
strained efforts to find a tort or a theoretical physical impact or injury and the consequent
tenuous reasoning in order to justify the award of damages for mental anguish.” Id. at 279–
80, 596 S.W.2d at 687.
240. In 1992, the federal courts addressed a case involving what appears to have been a
classic case of appropriation of likeness. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v.
Globe Int’l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd in part sub nom. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992), modified
on remand sub nom. Mitchell v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. Ark. 1993).
A 96-year-old woman’s photograph was used without her consent by the defendant publisher
to accompany a fictitious story in a supermarket tabloid with the headline, “Pregnancy forces
granny to quit work at age 101.” Id. at 792. A decade earlier, the same tabloid had published
a “fairly accurate account” of the plaintiff using the same photograph, which it had purchased
from a local newspaper. People’s Bank, 978 F.2d at 1069. While the facts appear to have
clearly supported a claim for commercial appropriation of the plaintiff’s likeness, the case
went to trial and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on a false light invasion of privacy theory. Id. at
1070. For a discussion of the case in the context of false light, see infra notes 502–14 and
accompanying text.
241. 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ark. 2001).
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Florida beach contest held during spring break.242 They filed a complaint in
federal court asserting various claims, including invasion of privacy by misappropriation and false light publicity.243 In enumerating the elements of the
misappropriation claim, the federal court cited a comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts explaining that mere publication of one’s likeness in
a commercial newspaper or magazine is not alone sufficient to support a
claim for misappropriation.244 Citing a Texas federal district court case, the
court held that the defendant must have capitalized on the plaintiff’s likeness
to sell more publications,245 citing Olan Mills in concluding that the misappropriation privacy tort requires commercial use of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.246
On this reasoning, the federal district court granted the defendants
summary judgment.247 First, even though Penthouse had identified the plaintiffs by name and hometown in the article, the court reasoned that they
failed to show that they “would be easily identified by the general public,”
relying once again on the Texas federal district court case.248 Second, the
plaintiffs failed to show that their names or photographs had been used to
advertise or otherwise promote sales of the magazine.249 The court concluded that summary judgment was proper because the publisher had not appropriated the plaintiffs’ names or likeness for commercial use.250
The Stanley court incorrectly interpreted Olan Mills and the Restatement in holding that the plaintiff must establish a commercial use to support
a claim for invasion of privacy by misappropriation. To the contrary, the
relevant section of the Restatement and its accompanying comments do not
require a commercial use to support the claim.251 Rather, like the Arkansas
Model Jury Instructions, the Restatement requires only that the use of plaintiff’s name or likeness must be to the defendant’s advantage, commercial or

242. Id. at 704. The plaintiffs had voluntarily participated in the contest to determine
who, while blindfolded, could most quickly unwrap and fit a condom on a white plastic phallus. Id.
243. Id. The false light claim was dismissed because the plaintiffs admitted that the photograph was accurate, and the court reasoned that the text accompanying the photo could not
reasonably be interpreted as a false statement of fact. Id. at 707.
244. Id. at 706 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(c) [sic] cmt. (1977)).
245. Stanley, 149 F. Supp. at 706 (citing Fredrickson v. Hustler Mag., 607 F. Supp. 1341,
1360 (N.D. Tex. 1985)).
246. Id. (citing Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962),
without a specific pinpoint reference).
247. Id. at 706–07.
248. Id. at 706 (citing Fredrickson, 607 F. Supp. at 1360).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 706–07.
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C & cmt. b (1977).

2013]

ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY

471

otherwise.252 The Restatement’s requirement concerning the nature of the
defendant’s use is a straightforward disjunctive standard. Commercial use
by the defendant is sufficient, but not necessary, as long as the defendant
uses the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant’s own purposes or
benefit.253
Unfortunately, the mistake in Stanley was recently replicated in
LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc.254 In that case, an ophthalmologist sued his former affiliate, a laser surgery corporation, in part for
sending a patient notification letter bearing his forged digital signature without his consent, and for displaying his name and likeness in its advertising
after the affiliation had terminated.255 While the court denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, it erred in holding that under Arkansas law, “the defendant must have capitalized on the use of the plaintiff’s likeness or name by
selling more of a product or service.”256
Olan Mills, the only case the Arkansas Supreme Court has ever decided
concerning a claim for misappropriation of name or likeness, undoubtedly
involved a use of plaintiff’s likeness for commercial purposes.257 But the
defendant in that case did not dispute the merits of the plaintiff’s privacy
claim.258 While the Olan Mills court expressly recognized the privacy claim
only to the extent of the facts presented, the court’s holding was limited to
the sole issue on appeal: whether the plaintiff could recover more than nominal damages despite the lack of physical injury accompanying her claim for
mental anguish.259 Nevertheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly
cited Olan Mills as authority for having adopted the common law right of

252. Id.; see also ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 (Ark. Supreme Court
Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (“Fourth, that [defendant]'s use of [plaintiff]'s
[name][or][likeness] was for [defendant]'s own purposes or benefit, commercial or otherwise”) (emphasis added). But see id. cmt. (citing Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 706, as having
“confirmed” that the tort requires commercial use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness).
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (plaintiff may recover “even
though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is
not a pecuniary one”); ELDER, supra note 51, § 6:3 (citing a host of cases allowing recovery
for appropriation of name or likeness for noncommercial uses). Only in a very limited number of states like New York, which does not recognize a common law privacy cause of action
but has enacted a restrictive statutory cause of action for misappropriation, do the cases restrict recovery to commercial uses only. ELDER, supra note 51, § 6:3 (text accompanying note
16).
254. 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 899 (E.D. Ark. 2011).
255. Id. at 893, 894.
256. Id. at 899 (citing Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706
(W.D. Ark. 2001)).
257. See Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 496, 353 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1962).
258. Id. at 498, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
259. Id. at 498–99, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
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privacy in the four iterations defined in the Restatement.260 If the Arkansas
courts were to squarely address the issue, they would most likely recognize
a noncommercial use as sufficient to support a claim for misappropriation,
as long as the defendant uses the plaintiff’s identity for its own benefit without consent.261
The other elements of the appropriation claim are straightforward as
outlined in the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.262 First, the plaintiff must
prove damages.263 Second, the defendant must have used the plaintiff’s
name or likeness.264 Third, the plaintiff must be identifiable by the public
from the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity.265 Fourth, as discussed
above, the use must be for the defendant’s own purposes or benefit, commercial or otherwise.266 Fifth, the defendant’s use must be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s compensable harm.267
Related to the privacy tort for misappropriation of name or likeness is
the cause of action for invasion of what is now commonly known as the
“right of publicity.”268 Neither the Arkansas courts nor the federal courts
applying Arkansas law have ever explicitly recognized this cause of action,
nor have they had occasion to distinguish it from the right of privacy based
on appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity.269 A later section of this Article
addresses the right of publicity in more detail.270 For now, it is sufficient to
note that neither Arkansas statutes nor case law has addressed the issue.

260. E.g., Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 636–38 & n.8, 590 S.W.2d 840,
844–45 & n.8 (1979); see ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 cmt. (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (citing Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 9,
678 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1984), in support of the Restatement definition).
261. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 652C (1977). But see HOWARD W. BRILL &
CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33:11, at 639 (5th ed. 2004) (“The tort
of appropriation is limited to instances of commercial use of a person’s name or likeness.”
(citing Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 701)).
262. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 2D
§§ 1:1–1:7 (2012).
269. See generally Rashauna A. Norment, Post-Mortem Right of Publicity in Arkansas:
Protecting Against the Unauthorized Use of a Person’s Identity for Commercial Purposes, 34
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 507 (2012) (advocating that Arkansas adopt a post-mortem
right of publicity).
270. See infra Part V.B. and accompanying notes.

2013]
B.

ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY

473

Intrusion on Seclusion

Unlike other privacy claims, intrusion on seclusion has been a frequent
subject of litigation in Arkansas.271 The Arkansas Supreme Court first addressed the claim in 1981 in CBM of Central Arkansas v. Bemel,272 a debt
collection case. The plaintiff sued after the defendant collection agency repeatedly called her at work and at home over a period of ten months to recover a small unpaid balance on a hospital bill for her son, who had been
hospitalized after attempting suicide.273 Insurance coverage paid most of the
hospital expenses, but a balance of about $400 remained unpaid.274 The collection agency sent the plaintiff some fifty letters and made about seventy
phone calls to her during this period.275 Although plaintiff had protested to
the defendant’s agents that she worked until midnight and therefore slept
until about 10:00 a.m., many calls were made to her home in the early morning hours while she was sleeping.276
The case was tried to a jury on alternate theories of invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.277 After the jury awarded
Bemel $1,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000 in punitive damages,
the trial court denied the collection agency’s motion for a directed verdict.278
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict for intrusion on seclusion,
as defined in section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.279 In particular, the court focused on the frequency and persistence of the collection
agency’s efforts to collect the debt, which it considered a substantial enough
interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion to support the claim.280
271. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
272. 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981).
273. Id. at 224, 623 S.W.2d at 519.
274. Id., 623 S.W.2d at 519.
275. Id., 623 S.W.2d at 519.
276. Id. at 225, 623 S.W.2d at 519.
277. Id. at 224, 623 S.W.2d at 519.
278. Bemel, 274 Ark. at 224, 623 S.W.2d at 519.
279. Id. at 225–26, 623 S.W.2d at 519–20. The court observed that it had “recognized
such a cause of action in Olan Mills.” Id. at 225, 623 S.W.2d at 519. In that case, however,
the court merely referenced section 867 of the 1939 Restatement, which then recognized a
general claim for invasion of privacy, including “unauthorized publication of a person who is
not in public life.” Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 497–98 & n.1, 353
S.W.2d at 23–24 & n.1 (1962). The Olan Mills court did not recognize a claim for intrusion
on seclusion. Nor did it expressly hold that Arkansas recognizes a claim for invasion of privacy or even misappropriation of likeness, except to the extent the court upheld the jury’s
damage award on appeal. See id.
280. Bemel, 274 Ark. at 225–26, 623 S.W.2d at 519–20.
“There is likewise no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary
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The Arkansas Supreme Court next addressed a claim for intrusion on
seclusion in Dunlap v. McCarty.281 The complaint alleged invasion of privacy based on verbal communications in two separate phone calls to Mrs.
McCarty made by the wife of Mr. McCarty’s former brother-in-law.282 The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs but awarded no damages.283 Nevertheless, the defendants appealed, arguing among other things that the action
was time-barred and therefore should have been dismissed.284
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed. The court observed that if the
plaintiffs had a privacy claim of any sort, it was a claim for intrusion on
seclusion.285 Relying on the Restatement, the court cited several illustrations
of conduct that could support a claim for intrusion on seclusion, finding
none analogous to two phone calls.286 The court then questioned whether
oral communications alone could even support a claim for invasion of privacy, noting that courts had been divided on the issue.287 Leaving that issue
aside,288 the court observed that the facts presented did not qualify as either a
“classic case of invasion of privacy by intrusion on seclusion or one of defamation.”289 But no matter how the claim was denominated, the court observed that the plaintiffs were seeking special damages based solely on oral
communications, for which an Arkansas statute specifically provides a oneyear statute of limitation.290 Because the complaint was filed more than one

reasonable man, as a result of conduct to which the reasonable man would
strongly object. . . . It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such
persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that
becomes a substantial burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.”
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (1977)).
281. 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984).
282. Id. at 6, 678 S.W.2d at 362.
283. Id., 678 S.W.2d at 362.
284. Id., 678 S.W.2d at 362.
285. Id. at 9, 678 S.W.2d at 364.
286. Id., 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b,
illus. (1977)).
287. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 9–10, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citations omitted); see ELDER, supra
note 51, § 1:2.
288. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364. The court has not resolved the issue
since first acknowledging it in Dunlap. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421
cmt. (2012) (citing Dunlap in observing that the court has expressly declined to resolve the
issue).
289. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364. The court had earlier characterized
Bemel as a “case of harassment by a bill collector and a classic case of invasion of privacy.”
Id. at 9, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518). While the court
downplayed the conduct in this case as dissimilar from a classic invasion of privacy, several
jurisdictions have found defendants liable for intrusion on seclusion for actions interfering
with family or other nonmarital relationships. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 2:25 (citing cases).
290. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 37-201).
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year after the defendant made the phone calls, the court concluded that the
claim was time-barred.291
Soon after, the court upheld an award of compensatory and punitive
damages for invasion of privacy in AAA T.V. & Stereo Rentals, Inc. v.
Crawley.292 The defendant repossessed a rented television set from the plaintiff’s home when she was just one week behind in making payments.293 To
effect the repossession, the defendant’s employees forced open her front
door and removed the television while the plaintiff was at work.294 She testified that she had been called off the assembly line, and she was embarrassed
and frightened for her children when she learned that unknown intruders had
broken into her home.295
On her invasion of privacy claim, the jury awarded $4,590 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages.296 Among other issues on
appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s jury instructions, including
its failure to define invasion of privacy as “an unreasonable and substantial
intrusion upon the seclusion of another.”297 The defendant also complained
that the jury was instructed that if it found an invasion of privacy, the plaintiff was entitled to “substantial damages.”298 The court affirmed, observing
that the “jury may well have felt a degree of indignation over the flagrant
intrusion suffered by Mrs. Crawley at the hands of AAA’s employees . . .
.”299 Moreover, having interposed only a general objection to the jury instructions at trial, the defendant failed to show reversible error.300
The Arkansas appellate courts once again addressed claims of intrusion
on seclusion in a pair of companion cases in which co-employees sought
damages from Wal-Mart based on an investigation of its employees and
recovery of allegedly stolen property.301 In the first, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Lee,302 the court upheld a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff a total of
291. Id. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 365. For most invasion of privacy claims under Arkansas
law, the three-year statute of limitations applies. See Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629, 634,
899 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1995) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-105 (Repl. 2005)) (affirming
summary judgment in invasion of privacy case on statute of limitations grounds); see infra
Part IV.G.1. and accompanying notes (discussing statute of limitations defense).
292. 284 Ark. 83, 679 S.W.2d 190 (1984).
293. Id. at 84, 679 S.W.2d at 191.
294. Id., 679 S.W.2d at 191.
295. Id. at 85, 679 S.W.2d at 191.
296. Id. at 84, 679 S.W.2d at 191.
297. Id. at 86, 679 S.W.2d at 191–92 (citing, e.g., CBM of Cent. Ark. v. Bemel, 274 Ark.
223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981)).
298. Crawley, 284 Ark. at 86, 679 S.W.2d at 191–92.
299. Id. at 85, 679 S.W.2d at 191.
300. Id. at 86, 679 S.W.2d at 192 (quoting ARK. R. CIV. P. 51).
301. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002); Addington
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003).
302. 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634.
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$1,651,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.303 Among other claims,
the plaintiff alleged intrusion on seclusion and publicity placing him in a
false light.304 On appeal, Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s evidence was
insufficient to establish the essential elements of intrusion,305 which the majority carefully enumerated by directly quoting the jury instruction.306
In affirming the judgment and jury verdict, the court explicitly adopted
the Restatement definition of intrusion on seclusion,307 observing that the
“touchstone” of the privacy tort for intrusion is “[a] legitimate expectation
of privacy.”308 While neither party challenged the jury instruction, it was
closely patterned after the Restatement definition,309 listing the following
elements: (1) damages sustained by plaintiff; (2) intrusion by defendant,
physically or otherwise, on plaintiff’s solitude without permission, invitation, or valid consent; (3) substantial interference by defendant with plaintiff’s solitude; (4) interference of a kind an ordinary person would consider
highly offensive; (5) conduct by defendant to which a reasonable person
would object; and (6) proximate causation.310 The jury was also instructed
that “[a] person validly consents to an intrusion if, in the totality of circumstances, the consent is given freely and without coercion.”311
On appeal, Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff offered insufficient evidence to support two essential elements of the intrusion claim: that the defendant’s interference was substantial, and that the plaintiff had a legitimate
expectation of privacy.312 Both points rested on the underlying argument that
the plaintiff had consented to defendant’s allegedly intrusive conduct not
only verbally and in writing, but also implicitly by failing to object while the
investigation and search were underway on his property.313
The court observed that an actionable intrusion occurs only if the defendant believes or is substantially certain that he lacks permission to engage in the intrusive conduct.314 Because the defendant’s actual knowledge
303. Id. at 744, 74 S.W.3d at 660.
304. Id. at 713, 74 S.W.3d at 640.
305. Id. at 719, 74 S.W.3d at 644.
306. Id. at 720–21, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45. Because neither party objected to the jury instruction, the appellate court did not address whether or not the instruction accurately described the claim for intrusion. See id. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 645.
307. Id. at 720, 74 S.W.3d at 644 (citing with approval Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods
of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000)).
308. Lee, 348 Ark. at 720, 74 S.W.3d at 644 (citing Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 877).
309. See id. at 720–21, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45.
310. Id. at 720, 74 S.W.3d at 644; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
(1977).
311. Lee, 348 Ark. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45.
312. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 645.
313. See id. at 721–27, 74 S.W.3d at 645–49.
314. Id. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 645 (citing Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 876); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
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that he lacks permission is an essential element, the plaintiff has the burden
to prove the defendant was aware, or at least substantially certain, that the
plaintiff did not consent.315 In this respect, the plaintiff must prove not only
that he did not consent, but also that the defendant in fact believed (or at
least was substantially certain) that the plaintiff did not consent.316
Despite this heavy burden of proof, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lee
upheld the jury verdict, along with its finding that the plaintiff had successfully established each required element.317 The majority reasoned that the
evidence showed that any verbal consent he gave was limited in scope,
which the defendant’s investigation and search had far exceeded.318 With
respect to the plaintiff’s written consent, the jury correctly concluded that it
was involuntary and hence invalid because it had been coerced.319
One justice added a lengthy dissent challenging the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff had not validly consented to the defendant’s investigation and search.320 The dissenter reasoned that the plaintiff could not have
had a legitimate expectation of privacy when he gave both verbal and written consent to the search.321 Further, the dissent would have held that the
evidence “overwhelmingly” established that plaintiff’s consent was both
knowing and voluntary because the written form he signed had specifically
authorized the defendant’s agents to search plaintiff’s entire premises and

315. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm.
on Jury Instructions 2013) (consent defense). The consent instruction is not to be used with
the instruction for intrusion on seclusion because “the absence of consent or other authority is
part of a plaintiff’s burden of proof under such a claim.” Id. note on use.
316. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (second element). Although the
issue is not free from doubt, the court’s reasoning that nonconsent is an element of a claim
for intrusion on seclusion, rather than an affirmative defense, appears to be consistent with
the majority rule. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 2:12 (citations omitted) (“[T]he preferable
perspective . . . is that consent, whether express or implied, negates the existence of the tort
itself.”). The plaintiff’s legitimate interest in solitude or seclusion, a required element of the
claim, may be negated by his own conduct implying consent. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B). Nevertheless, the plaintiff can vitiate express or implied consent
by showing that it was involuntary, that it was procured by fraud, or that the intrusion exceeded the scope of the consent given. Id. (citing cases, including Lee, 348 Ark. at 720, 74
S.W.3d at 644).
317. Lee, 348 Ark. at 727, 74 S.W.3d at 649.
318. Id. at 724–27, 74 S.W.3d at 646–48.
319. Id. at 726, 74 S.W.3d at 648. “The jury determined that [plaintiff’s] written consent
was not given freely and without coercion and, thus, was not valid consent. Considering the
totality of the circumstances now before us, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to
support the jury’s decision.” Id., 74 S.W.3d at 648.
320. Id. at 745, 74 S.W.3d at 660 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
321. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 660.
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take any property they deemed necessary.322 Nor did the plaintiff object or
otherwise indicate that the search should be limited in scope.323
The dispositive issue in Lee turned out to be whether the plaintiff’s
verbal, written, and implied consent was “valid,” defined as “given freely
and without coercion.”324 As the majority observed, the issue of consent and
the scope of any consent are both fact questions for the jury.325 The plaintiff
believed he had verbally consented only to a limited search for fishing
equipment and lifejackets, and he was under the impression he would be
fired if he refused consent.326 While the defendant’s evidence contradicted
the plaintiff’s testimony, the majority correctly observed that the credibility
of witness testimony was a question of fact for the jury to resolve.327 In this
case, the majority identified substantial evidence in the record supporting
the jury’s decision.328
In the second companion case, Addington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,329
the plaintiff did not fare so well before the trial court. The defendant won
summary judgment on all claims, including intrusion on seclusion.330 On
appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals followed the precedent established in
Lee,331 holding that summary judgment on the intrusion claim was precluded
because genuine issues of material fact remained concerning whether Addington’s consent to the search was valid.332 The court cited Lee in reasoning
that while the standard for determining the validity of consent to search in a
criminal context was not controlling, it was nevertheless “helpful.”333 Thus,
“[c]onsent must be given freely and voluntarily to be valid.”334
It must be shown that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied.
The voluntariness of consent must be judged in light of the totality of the
circumstances. In a civil case, the issue of whether consent was valid is a
question of fact that must be decided by the trier of fact.335

322. Id. at 749, 74 S.W.3d at 663.
323. Lee, 348 Ark. at 749, 74 S.W.3d at 663.
324. Id. at 721, 74 S.W.3d at 644–45 (majority opinion).
325. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 645.
326. Id. at 721–22, 74 S.W.3d at 645–46.
327. Id. at 724, 74 S.W.3d at 646.
328. Id. at 726–27, 74 S.W.3d at 648.
329. 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003).
330. Id. at 445, 105 S.W.3d at 373 (outrage, false light invasion of privacy, intrusion
invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligence).
331. See supra notes 302–28 and accompanying text.
332. Addington, 81 Ark. App. at 457, 105 S.W.3d at 380.
333. Id. at 456, 105 S.W.3d at 380.
334. Id., 105 S.W.3d at 380 (citing Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d
634 (2002)).
335. Id., 105 S.W.3d at 380 (citations omitted).
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Observing that the Arkansas Supreme Court had upheld a jury verdict for
the plaintiff under similar circumstances, the Court of Appeals reversed the
summary judgment and remanded for trial.336
More recently, in Coombs v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.,337 the Arkansas
Court of Appeals addressed a claim for intrusion on seclusion against the
plaintiff’s former employer and two of its vice-presidents. The employer
sued a former employee for violating a covenant not to compete, and the
plaintiff counterclaimed; he also filed a third-party complaint against two of
his former co-employees for invasion of privacy, wrongful discharge, and
related claims.338 During an out-of-town retreat with several other employees, Coombs had become intoxicated and retreated to the hotel room he
shared with Allensworth, one of the third-party defendants.339 There,
Coombs passed out on the floor, still fully clothed.340 Sometime later,
Allensworth and Emerson, the other third-party defendant, entered the hotel
room and found Coombs asleep on the floor.341 Using a cell phone, the two
photographed Coombs in a prone position after placing a cigarette in his
mouth, spraying his face with shaving cream, and writing messages on his
person.342 One of the pranksters called other employees into the hotel room
to view Coombs in this vulnerable state.343 Coombs recalled none of these
events the next morning, but he later learned what happened when he
viewed the photographs depicting him in various states of undress.344 The
photographs were also allegedly displayed to other employees.345
The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the intrusion counterclaim, reasoning that Coombs was aware that he was sharing the
hotel room with another person and had voluntarily become intoxicated.346
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed after reiterating the elements of
the intrusion claim as enumerated in the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.347 The court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that the hotel room was
shared, noting that a physical intrusion is not necessary to support the

336. Id. at 456–57, 459, 105 S.W.3d at 380, 382.
337. 2012 Ark. App. 24, 388 S.W.3d 456.
338. Id. at 3–4, 388 S.W.3d at 460.
339. Id. at 1–3, 388 S.W.3d at 459–60.
340. Id. at 2, 388 S.W.3d at 459.
341. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 459.
342. Id. at 2–3, 388 S.W.3d at 459–60.
343. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 3, 388 S.W. 3d at 460.
344. Id., 388 S.W. 3d at 460.
345. Id., 388 S.W. 3d at 460.
346. Id. at 5, 388 S.W.3d at 461.
347. Id. at 4–5, 388 S.W.3d at 460–61 (quoting ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CIVIL 420 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013)).
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claim.348 “Thus, protection is afforded not just for the physical realm but for
a person’s emotional sanctum and to safeguard the notions of civility and
personal dignity. Further, a person’s visibility to some does not necessarily
strip him of the right to remain secluded from others.”349 The court could not
agree with the trial court that no intrusion had occurred as a matter of law.350
The Court of Appeals also rejected the employer’s argument that the
intrusion, if any, was not highly offensive to a reasonable person.351 It reasoned that a fact finder could view the acts of the third-party defendants as
“an invasion of Coombs’s bodily space during a time when he was unaware
of his surroundings and as making him an object of ridicule among his coworkers.”352
Finally, the court identified an unresolved fact issue: whether Coombs
had comported himself in a manner consistent with an “actual” expectation
of privacy.353 The court reviewed the allegations by both parties and found
them inconclusive enough to present a fact issue precluding summary judgment.354
The Court of Appeals also addressed an issue of first impression in the
context of a claim for invasion of privacy: whether an employer can be vicariously liable for intrusive conduct committed by its supervisory employees.355 Coombs argued in part that the former employer could be liable for
the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory.356 The court
agreed, relying on Arkansas cases holding that an employer may be vicariously liable for acts of its employees carried out in the scope of employment.357 In this case, the co-employees’ conduct occurred during a work
retreat at which the plaintiff’s attendance was mandatory.358 It was a fact
question whether the offensive conduct was “purely personal” or occurred
while the co-employees were acting in the course of their employment responsibilities.359 The court concluded that “[w]hen an overlap of the busi348. Id. at 5, 388 S.W.3d at 461. “An intrusion may occur physically ‘or otherwise.’” Id.,
388 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420).
349. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 5, 388 S.W.3d at 461 (multiple citations to cases from
other jurisdictions omitted).
350. Id. at 6, 388 S.W.3d at 461.
351. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 461.
352. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 461–62.
353. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 462.
354. Id. at 7, 388 S.W.3d at 462.
355. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 7–8, 388 S.W.3d at 462–63.
356. Id. at 7, 388 S.W.3d at 462.
357. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 462 (citing, e.g., Porter v. Harshfield, 329 Ark. 130, 948 S.W.2d
83 (1997)). Whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment or not depends
on whether the employee is carrying out the purpose of the employer’s enterprise or instead is
acting exclusively in the employee’s own interest. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 462 (citations omitted).
358. Coombs, 2012 Ark. App. at 2, 388 S.W.3d at 459.
359. Id. at 8, 388 S.W.3d at 462–63.
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ness and the personal are present in an employee’s actions, an employer may
be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, depending on
the circumstances.”360
In late 2012, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed some intriguing
issues of first impression with respect to an intrusion claim in Cannady v. St.
Vincent Infirmary Medical Center.361 Compared to the court’s progressive
resolution of privacy issues over the last decade, the Arkansas Supreme
Court took a surprisingly regressive approach to the novel legal issues the
case presented. The case involved the tragic murder of Anne Pressly, a wellknown Little Rock newswoman.362 Her mother, Patricia Cannady, sued the
hospital and three of its employees alleging invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.363 Cannady sued on her own behalf
and as administratrix of Pressly’s estate.364
Cannady claimed that the defendant hospital employees had unlawfully
accessed Pressly’s medical records and failed to take proper steps to prevent
improper access to medical records in the hospital’s electronic database.365
The three employees were each convicted after pleading guilty to violating
the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),366
which criminalizes wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health
information.367 Therefore, the defendants had no basis for disputing either
the intrusion itself or that it was intentional.
Cannady appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment on
all claims, not only those filed on her own behalf but also those filed on
behalf of the Pressly estate.368 With respect to the intrusion claim on behalf
of the estate, the trial court held that the claim did not survive the decedent.369 On appeal, Cannady argued that the trial court had erred in interpret360. Id., 388 S.W.3d at 463 (citing J.B. Hunt Transp. v. Doss, 320 Ark. 660, 899 S.W.2d
464 (1995)).
361. 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d ___, reh’g denied, Nov. 8, 2012.
362. Id., ___ S.W.3d ___.
363. Id. at 1, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
364. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___.
365. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
366. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6)(a)(2) (2006).
367. Id. Upon conviction, federal statutes classify a “simple criminal violation” for knowingly obtaining health information in violation of HIPAA as a misdemeanor punishable by up
to one year in prison, a fine of up to $50,000, or both. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006); see
PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY § 3:2.5 (2007). A violation of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, however, does
not allow the victim to file a civil cause of action against the perpetrator. See Bonney v. Stephens Mem. Hosp., 17 A.3d 123, 127–28 (Me. 2011). “[A]ll courts that have decided this
question have concluded that HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action.” Id. at 127.
But cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107 (Supp. 2011) (authorizing civil cause of action by a
victim of conduct by another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law).
368. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 1, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
369. Id. at 1, 4, ___S.W.3d at ____.
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ing the Arkansas survival statute370 to mean that Pressly’s privacy claim did
not survive.371 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed on the survival issue.372 In rejecting the privacy claim on behalf of the estate, the court relied
primarily on Ward v. Blackwood,373 an Arkansas case decided nearly a century and a half earlier, long before any court in the United States had ever
recognized the right of privacy.374
Under the Restatement, a claim for invasion of privacy is generally
considered personal in nature because it involves an injury to a personal
right.375 Thus, the legal question before the Cannady court was whether a
claim for invasion of the personal right of privacy survives after the death of
the person whose privacy has been invaded.376
The court quoted the following subsections of the applicable Arkansas
survival statute:
(a)(1) For wrongs done to the person or property of another, an action
may be maintained against a wrongdoer, and the action may be brought
370. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2005).
371. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 4, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
372. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
373. 41 Ark. 295 (1883). The court also quoted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I
cmt. b (1977). Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 7, ___S.W.3d at ___ (absent a statute to the contrary,
an invasion of privacy claim “cannot be maintained after the death of the individual whose
privacy is invaded,” excepting a claim for appropriation of name or likeness). However, the
court ignored the language quoted from the Restatement recognizing that states may allow for
survival of claims by statute. Id., ___S.W.3d at ___. The Arkansas survival statute does just
that. Nevertheless, the court interpreted the language of the statute referring to “wrongs done
to the person . . . of another” to exclude invasion of privacy claims, even though they protect
a right the Restatement itself characterizes as a “personal right.” Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___.
374. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 5–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. In 1883, neither Arkansas nor any
other state recognized the common law right of privacy. See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text. Moreover, Arkansas law at that time did not recognize any claim for mental anguish or emotional distress alone apart from physical injury. See St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co.
v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42, 48, 104 S.W. 551, 553 (1907) (no recovery for mental anguish or humiliation independent of physical injury or other recoverable damages, even if legal duty was
willfully violated). The rationale for that holding was that “mental suffering unaccompanied
by physical injury . . . is deemed to be too remote, uncertain, and difficult of ascertainment . .
. .” Id., 104 S.W. at 553. But see M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 275–76, 596 S.W.2d
681, 684–685 (1980) (expressly recognizing, for the first time, a claim seeking recovery for
emotional distress independent of physical injury or other recoverable damages; observing
that Taylor had been implicitly abrogated); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 139, 25 S.W.2d
428, 428 (1930) (mental suffering alone was recoverable as an element of damages that proximately resulted from defendant’s willful act); Lyons v. Smith, 176 Ark. 728, 729, 3 S.W.2d
982, 983 (1928) (mental suffering, annoyance, fear, intimidation, and so forth, will support a
cause of action for damages even when unaccompanied by physical injury, if caused by
“willful and wanton wrong”). For a brief discussion of Counce and its interpretation of the
court’s reasoning in Olan Mills, see supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
375. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. a.
376. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 4, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
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by the person injured or, after his or her death, by his or her executor or
administrator against the wrongdoer or, after the death of the wrongdoer,
against the executor or administrator of the wrongdoer, in the same manner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts.
(2) Nothing in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be so construed as
377
to extend its provisions to actions of slander or libel.

The plain language of the subsection (a) suggests that the estate may assert a
claim for invasion of privacy after the person’s death because invasion of
privacy is undoubtedly a “wrong[ ] done to the person . . . of another.”378
To the contrary, the Arkansas Supreme Court held otherwise.379 Relying on the 1883 case of Ward, which had interpreted “an earlier version” of
the survival statute,380 the court held that the current version preserves only
actions substantially characterized by bodily injury or physical damage, not
“torts which do not directly affect the person, but only the feelings or reputation, such as malicious prosecution.”381 The court rejected Cannady’s argument that the only torts excepted from the survival statute are libel and
slander, as expressly provided in subsection (a)(2).382
In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged but declined to follow other jurisdictions that have allowed a cause of action for invasion of
privacy by surviving relatives based on facts similar to those presented in
Cannady.383 Instead, the court cited and quoted at length from a 1913 Arkansas case384 holding that claims on behalf of a defunct corporation did not
survive its dissolution.385 In that case, the court had reasoned in part that
377. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a) (Repl. 2005) (emphasis added).
378. Id.
379. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___S.W.3d at ___.
380. Id. at 5–6, ___ S.W.3d at ___. In 1883, when Ward v. Blackwood was decided, the
survival statute read as follows:
For wrongs done to the person or property of another, an action may be maintained against the wrong-doers, and such action may be brought by the person injured, or, after his death, by his executor or administrator, against such wrongdoer, or, after his death, against his executor or administrator, in the same manner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts.
Gantt’s. Dig. § 4760.
381. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 5, ___S.W.3d at ___ (quoting Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark.
295, 298 (1883)).
382. Id. at 5, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
383. Id. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (citing Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998)
(holding that immediate relatives of decedent had a privacy interest in decedent’s autopsy
records that supported claim against county employees for improperly accessing and displaying autopsy photographs)).
384. Ark. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 110 Ark. 130, 137, 161 S.W. 136, 138
(1913).
385. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 6, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
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“‘the statute means injuries of a physical character to actual, visible, and
tangible property, and not to property rights or interests which in their nature
are invisible and intangible.’”386
The court ultimately agreed with the defendants’ arguments that the
survival statute “[did] not provide for the claim of invasion of privacy to
survive the death of the decedent.”387 In doing so, the court ignored the undisputed fact that the defendants’ conduct had been so egregious with respect to the decedent’s privacy interests that they had pleaded guilty to federal criminal offenses for violating HIPAA’s privacy protections.388 The
Arkansas Supreme Court’s reasoning relied largely on common law that
long predates not only the court’s own recognition of the right of privacy,
but also the court’s recognition of other intentional tort claims that allow
recovery for emotional injury independent of any physical injury or property
damage.389
In relying on century-old common law, the court also disregarded the
language of the modern Arkansas survival statute, which plainly allows for
the survival of claims “[f]or wrongs done to the person or property of another,”390 excepting only claims for slander or libel.391 While the Arkansas Supreme Court has not questioned its own outdated interpretation of the survival statute, the Arkansas General Assembly itself has amended the statute
to recognize “wrongs” to the person manifested by emotional and other intangible harm.392 Most recently, the survival statute was amended in 2001 to
include a new subsection (b) that explicitly allows an estate to seek damages
for “loss of life,” a category of intangible injury,393 in addition to any other
386. Id. at 6, ___S.W.3d at ___ (quoting Ark. Life Ins. Co., 110 Ark. at 137, 161 S.W. at
138). The quoted language has nothing whatsoever to do with personal rights, but rather
distinguishes injuries to corporate intangible property interests from injuries to tangible property. In stark contrast, Patricia Cannady asserted a privacy claim for intrusion on her deceased
daughter’s personal interest in seclusion, not her property interests.
387. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___. After summarizing the parties’ respective arguments and
without elaborating, the court simply observed, “This holding is in line with this court’s
adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and our case law, most notably Ward. Thus,
we affirm the grant of summary judgment on this point.” Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___.
388. Id. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___. The complaint alleged, apparently without objection,
that defendants Holland, Griffin, and Miller had each pled guilty to a violation of HIPAA,
specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(6)(a)(2) (2006), which prohibits wrongful disclosure of
individually identifiable health information. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
389. E.g., M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 273–77, 596 S.W.2d 681, 684–85
(1980); see supra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
390. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2005) (emphasis added).
391. See id. § 16-62-101(a)(2).
392. See id. § 16-62-101.
393. See Joshua Michael Robles, Note, Arkansas’s Application of Hedonic Damages to
Wrongful-Death Suits: Is Arkansas’s Method Misconceived?, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 299, 308–09 (2011) (loss of life, like mental anguish and emotional distress, is considered a type of noneconomic harm).
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elements of recoverable damages.394 Yet the Cannady court completely
omitted that subsection from the statutory language the opinion directly
quoted.395
In short, the Cannady court erred by ignoring the plain language of the
current survival statute, considered in the context of common law developments in the latter half of the twentieth century. At the very least, the court
should have acknowledged the 2001 amendment and its implications for
outmoded case law that interpreted former survival statutes to exclude personal torts resulting in noneconomic or intangible harm. Cannady represents
an unfortunate step backward in Arkansas privacy law. The opinion fails to
acknowledge that the survival statute itself is a departure from the common
law rule that tort actions did not survive the plaintiff.396
Especially in light of the 2001 amendment, the fact that the Arkansas
courts have never questioned century-old case interpretations of the predecessor survival statutes is irrelevant. The court has held that in construing
statutes, the language in question must be considered “in the context of the
statute as a whole.”397 The Arkansas General Assembly had no reason to
include a specific provision in the survival statute excluding defamation
claims unless it had intended the general reference to “wrongs to the person”
to allow survival of other “wrongs done to the person or property of another.”398 Moreover, a statute must be interpreted “just as it reads, giving the
words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.”399
Cannady reflects an unduly strained interpretation of the Arkansas survival
statute given the developments in Arkansas privacy law over the last half
century.
Occasionally the federal courts have interpreted Arkansas common law
in resolving claims alleging intrusion on seclusion. While not binding on
Arkansas courts, a number of these federal cases are cited in commentary to

394. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(b). “In addition to all other elements of damages
provided by law, a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss of life as an independent element of damages.” Id.
395. See Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 5, ___ S.W.3d ___. See also supra note 377 and accompanying text.
396. “At common law, all actions for tort died with the tortfeasor. That rule is still in
effect in [Arkansas], except where changed by statute. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-62-101
(1987) has removed that bar as to tortious injury to the person.” Westridge v. Byrd, 37 Ark.
App. 72, 73, 823 S.W.2d 930, 930–31 (1992) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
Lauderdale v. Smith, 186 F. Supp. 958, 959 (E.D. Ark. 1960) (observing that Arkansas survival statute allowing survival of personal tort claims, other than libel and slander, is contrary
to federal common law rule that only contract and property tort actions survive).
397. Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 205, 4 S.W.3d 493, 496 (1999) (emphasis added).
398. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1).
399. Green, 339 Ark. at 205, 4 S.W.3d at 495.
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the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions.400 The earliest was Williams v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.401 The opinion primarily addressed a
question of federal evidence law pertaining to the reporter’s privilege asserted in consolidated cases involving the same incident.402 However, the court
also addressed one of the plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of privacy.403
The facts of Williams presented a classic example of intrusion on seclusion by virtue of overzealous news reporting. Defendant ABC aired a
segment of its 20/20 television program in January 1981, addressing the
extent to which the medical profession was engaging in unnecessary surgery.404 The program allegedly included portions of a videotape taken by
defendant’s reporters of Mrs. Davidson, without her knowledge or consent,
while she was undergoing hip replacement surgery at Boone County Hospital, performed by Dr. Williams.405 In considering the parties’ respective interests relevant to the assertion of the reporter’s privilege, the court delineated the four distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy recognized by
Professor Prosser, including intrusion on seclusion.406
This tort requires actions on the defendant’s part in the nature of prying
or intrusion which is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.
The “thing” into which there is intrusion or prying must be, and be entitled to be, private. As Prosser notes, “when the plaintiff is confined to a
hospital bed, and in all probability when he is merely in the seclusion of
his home, the making of a photograph is an invasion of a private right, of
which he is entitled to complain.”407

The court concluded that the reporters’ “outtakes” sought in discovery might
be relevant to prove the fact of the alleged intrusion and its extent, so they
were “clearly discoverable.”408
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also addressed a claim for intrusion on seclusion under Arkansas law in Alexander
v. Pathfinder, Inc.409 Mrs. Alexander filed several state and federal claims
against the defendants, an intermediate care facility for the mentally retard400. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 cmt. (Ark. Supreme Court Comm.
on Jury Instructions 2013).
401. 96 F.R.D. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
402. Id. at 660.
403. Id. at 668–69.
404. Id. at 660.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 669 (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, ch. 22 (3d ed. 1964);
Bill Prewett, Note, The Crimination of Peeping Toms and Other Men of Vision, 5 ARK. L.
REV. 388 (1951)).
407. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 669 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 406, § 112, ch. 22).
408. Id.
409. 189 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 1999).
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ed, its employees, and others, after her son was discharged from the facility.410 Among other state law claims, she sued for intrusion on seclusion.411
She alleged that the facility’s employees had improperly audiotaped her
conversations with her son, including some conversations in his room, as
well as her personal conversations with facility staff.412
The Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Alexander’s intrusion
claims on the basis of implied consent because she had not objected when
facility staff overtly audiotaped her conversations.413 Alexander had previously testified at an administrative hearing that she had not objected when
facility employees entered her son’s room carrying tape recorders for the
apparent purpose of recording her conversations with him.414 Although the
administrative record indicated that she had later objected, the court held
that her failure to do so at the inception was “fatal” to that part of her intrusion claim.415 With respect to the recording of her own conversations with
facility staff, Mrs. Alexander knew the staff had been directed to record all
her conversations, and the court observed that no Arkansas law precluded
one party to a conversation from recording a conversation with the other
party’s knowledge.416 Therefore, the trial court had properly dismissed both
of her intrusion claims.417
In 2000, the Eighth Circuit once again addressed a claim under Arkansas law for intrusion on seclusion in Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of
Trumann, Inc.418 The plaintiff, a food service worker, sued her former employer for intrusion on seclusion for contacting her physician to determine
whether she had a staph infection at the time she was terminated.419 When
the plaintiff applied for unemployment compensation, she denied having a
staph infection at the time of her termination.420 To secure the medical information, the defendant’s corporate manager supplied plaintiff’s physician
with a worker’s compensation authorization the plaintiff had signed previ410. Id. at 738.
411. Id. at 735.
412. Id. at 742.
413. See id. at 742–43.
414. Id.
415. Alexander, 189 F.3d at 742–43.
416. Id. at 743. While not directly relevant to the facts presented, ARK. CODE ANN. § 560-120(a) (Repl. 2005) allows a party to a cordless or cell phone conversation to record it
with or without the other party’s knowledge. Alexander, 189 F.3d at 743.
417. See id. at 742–43.
418. 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000).
419. Id. at 874. Arkansas health regulations forbid food preparation establishments from
employing workers with communicable diseases such as staph infections. Id. at 874 n.2 (citing Ark. Dept. of Health Regs., Food Service Establishments § 3-101 (effective Oct. 28,
1993)).
420. Id. at 874.
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ously after she sustained an on-the-job injury a few days before developing
the infection.421
The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages.422 The
trial court set aside the punitive damages award but allowed the verdict
awarding compensatory damages to stand.423 Because the sole cause of action was intrusion on seclusion, the Eighth Circuit panel424 reviewed applicable Arkansas law in some detail.425 The majority concluded that the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find that the manager’s intrusion
highly offensive to a reasonable person,426 that plaintiff’s conduct in telling a
co-worker about her staph infection was consistent with any subjective intent to keep the medical information private,427 and that any expectation of
privacy she did have was objectively reasonable considering her employment in the food service industry.428
Summarizing Arkansas law defining the privacy tort of intrusion on seclusion, the courts have repeatedly deferred to the applicable provisions of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its commentary.429 Consistent with
the Restatement, the Arkansas Model Jury Instruction requires five elements: (1) damages sustained by the plaintiff; (2) an intentional intrusion,
either physical or otherwise, on the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, to which
the defendant believed or was substantially certain the plaintiff did not validly consent; (3) an intrusion highly offensive to a reasonable person, caused
by defendant’s conduct to which a reasonable person would strongly object;
(4) an actual expectation of privacy manifested by the plaintiff’s conduct;
and (5) a proximate nexus between the intrusion and plaintiff’s damages.430
The second and fourth elements impose on the plaintiff the burden to show
the absence of valid consent, whether express or implied, to the defendant’s
intrusion.431 Notwithstanding the plain language of the Arkansas survival
421. Id. at 873–74.
422. Id. at 873.
423. Id.
424. One member of the panel concurred specially on the basis that the evidence in the
record negated the third element of the intrusion claim, a legitimate expectation of privacy,
because plaintiff had told two of her co-workers about the staph infection shortly after learning about it from her doctor. Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 879 (McMillian, J., concurring specially).
425. See id. at 871.
426. Id. at 877.
427. Id. at 877–78.
428. Id. at 878–79. In this respect, the majority reasoned that the defendant employer had
a legitimate reason to inquire about her infectious medical condition out of concern for public
health. Id. Under such conditions, “an employer’s need to know trumps an employee’s right
to privacy.” Id. at 879 (citation omitted).
429. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
430. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on
Jury Instructions 2013).
431. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424 note on use.
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statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recently held that a claim for intrusion does not survive the death of the person whose privacy was invaded by
the defendant’s intrusive conduct.432
C.

Publicity Given to Private Facts

While the Arkansas appellate courts have never directly addressed an
action for giving publicity to private facts, on several occasions they have
recognized the existence of the claim in dicta.433 Applying Arkansas law, the
federal courts have occasionally addressed this privacy tort, predicting that
Arkansas courts would apply the definition and guidelines outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.434 The Arkansas Supreme Court has published a jury instruction enumerating the elements of the claim, modeled
after the relevant provisions of the Restatement.435
Consistent with the Restatement,436 the plaintiff must establish seven
essential elements to successfully litigate a claim for invasion of privacy by
public disclosure of private facts: (1) plaintiff sustained damages; (2) defendant made a public disclosure about plaintiff; (3) before the disclosure,
the public lacked knowledge of the fact; (4) the disclosure of the fact would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (5) the defendant knew or should
have known that the fact disclosed was private; (6) the fact disclosed was
not of “legitimate public concern”; and (7) the public disclosure was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damages.437
To satisfy the second element requiring “public disclosure,” the plaintiff must establish that the defendant communicated the fact “to the public at
large or to so many persons that the matter is substantially certain to become
one of public knowledge.”438 It is not sufficient to establish “publication” of
the fact to just one or a small number of persons; the fact must be highly
likely to become a matter of public knowledge.439 The federal courts have

432. See Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
433. E.g., Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 637, 590 S.W.2d 840, 844 (1979)
(dicta) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2)(c)); see also Williams v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 96 F.R.D. 658, 669 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (dicta).
434. See Wood v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D. Ark. 1986)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D), aff’d, 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987);
Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 669; Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ’g Co., 6 Media L. Rptr.
(BNA) 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980); Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, LLC, 446 B.R. 306,
314 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).
435. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422.
436. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
437. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422.
438. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.
439. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.
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twice rejected privacy claims for publicity given to private facts for lack of
evidence to support the “public disclosure” element.440
The federal courts first acknowledged such a claim under Arkansas law
in Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publishing Co.441 In that case, the court held
in part that the information disclosed pertained to a matter of legitimate public concern, and therefore the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.442 In Boyd, the
parents of a deceased three-year-old child sued the newspaper for publishing
an article that reported the child’s full name and the fact that he had allegedly died as a result of cardiac arrest while under anesthesia administered by a
physician, who was then a defendant in an unrelated wrongful death case
alleging medical malpractice.443 In a court hearing involving a discovery
matter, the trial court suggested that the parties should protect the privacy
interests of patients who had died under similar circumstances.444 The next
morning, the newspaper reported the trial court’s ruling that evidence concerning others who had died under anesthesia, including plaintiffs’ son,
would be admissible at trial.445 The child’s parents claimed that by printing
his name and implying that he had died as a result of improper medical care,
the newspaper had invaded their privacy.446
The court disagreed and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim, citing alternative grounds.447 First, the court predicted that Arkansas
courts would not recognize a relational privacy interest on behalf of the
plaintiffs for an alleged invasion of their deceased son’s privacy.448 Second,
the court held that the information was a matter of legitimate public concern
because their son had been a victim of a tragic fatal accident.449 The court
reasoned that his death had again become a matter of legitimate public concern ancillary to the then-pending medical malpractice action against his
anesthesiologist.450
The federal court once again addressed a claim under Arkansas law for
publicity given to private facts in Wood v. National Computer Systems,
Inc.451 An Arkansas teacher filed a diversity claim for invasion of privacy
440. Wood v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1987); Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance, LLC, 446 B.R.
306, 314 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).
441. 6 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980).
442. Id. at 1023.
443. Id. at 1021.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Boyd, 6 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) at 1020.
448. Id. at 1022 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. a).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1023.
451. 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D. Ark. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987).
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against a testing company for erroneously mailing her teacher certification
test results to another teacher who had taken the same test.452 The plaintiff
promptly reported the error to the media, and within three days she received
her successful test results.453 The district court held in part that she could not
support her claim for giving publicity to private facts because her scores had
been sent inadvertently to only one other individual.454 Furthermore, any
public knowledge about the incident was attributable to the plaintiff’s own
contacts with local media, not any wrongful conduct by the defendant.455
Therefore, even if the information had become a matter of public
knowledge, it was not the result of defendant’s conduct.
In a more recent bankruptcy case, Dunbar v. Cox Health Alliance,
LLC,456 the federal district court once again held that the plaintiff failed to
meet the “publicity” requirement of her privacy claim.457 A creditor had
electronically filed a proof of claim that erroneously included the plaintiff’s
date of birth and medical information, in violation of court rules.458 While
the document was accessible via the federal court’s electronic case filing
system, the court reasoned that the public could not access the document
without taking specific affirmative steps to seek out the information.459 Just
because bankruptcy court records technically qualify as public records was
not enough to satisfy the “publicity” element of the claim.460 Further, the
plaintiff did not assert that anyone had actually accessed the proof of claim
or her personal information, which had been accessible by the public for
only three days.461 Therefore, the plaintiff failed to state a claim.462
A disclosure is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” only if a person would be seriously upset or embarrassed by the disclosure.463 The standard excludes normal everyday activities, or even “unflattering conduct” that

452. Id. at 1094–95.
453. Id. at 1094.
454. Id. at 1099.
455. Id. Affirming, the Eighth Circuit observed, “Here, there was no ‘publicity,’ properly
so called, but only disclosure to a single other person.” Wood, 814 F.2d at 545.
456. 446 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).
457. Id. at 315.
458. Id. at 308–09; see, e.g., Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9037 (requiring creditors to redact all
private information when filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy court). While the plaintiff
argued that disclosure of plaintiff’s medical information amounted to a HIPAA violation, the
parties agreed that no private cause of action arose from the HIPAA violation. Dunbar, 446
B.R. at 309–10.
459. Dunbar, 446 B.R. at 314–15.
460. Id. at 315 (citing In re French, 401 B.R. 295, 318 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009)).
461. Id. at 312, 315.
462. Id. at 315.
463. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on
Jury Instructions 2013).
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would cause only minor or moderate annoyance to a person with “ordinary
sensitivities.”464
If the information publicized relates to a matter of “legitimate public
concern,” a claim for publicity given to private facts is defeated. To determine whether this affirmative defense bars the claim, several factors must be
considered:465
(1) the social value of the fact published, (2) the depth of the intrusion
into [plaintiff’s] private affairs, (3) the extent to which [plaintiff] voluntarily placed [himself][herself] into a position of public notoriety, [(4)
the nature of the state’s interest in preventing the disclosure,] (5) whether
the fact is a matter of public record [and (6) if the fact publicized concerned events that occurred in the past, whether there is any continued
466
public interest in the fact published].

As previously noted, a federal district court concluded in 1980 that the information there at issue was a matter of legitimate public concern, and therefore could not support a claim for publicity given to private facts.467
One federal case alleging violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right
of privacy is particularly instructive on the element requiring proof that the
defendant knew the information disclosed was private.468 In Holman v. Central Arkansas Broadcasting Co.,469 plaintiff attorney and his wife were arrested and detained in jail on several charges, including driving while intoxicated.470 When counsel arrived to secure the couple’s release, the plaintiff
attorney began “hollering, cussing and screaming.”471 Defendant’s reporter
was nearby with a tape recorder, which picked up the outburst.472 The court
held that the plaintiff could not have made the statements the reporter could
easily overhear with an expectation that the communications would be private, and therefore the allegations did not support a civil rights claim under
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.473 The court also observed that “no right to privacy
is invaded when state officials allow or facilitate publication of an official
act such as an arrest.”474
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id. The bracketed language is to be included only if supported by the evidence. Id.
note on use.
467. Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ’g Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1020, 1023
(W.D. Ark. 1980); see supra notes 449–50 and accompanying text.
468. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422.
469. 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979).
470. Id. at 543.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 544–45.
474. Id. at 544.
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Given the dearth of Arkansas precedent interpreting the seven essential
elements of publicity given to private facts, the Arkansas courts are likely to
defer to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to resolve any other issues not
specifically addressed in the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions, just as they
have done for other common law privacy claims.
D.

False Light Publicity

After intrusion on seclusion, the most frequently litigated privacy claim
in Arkansas is publicity placing plaintiff in a false light. The Arkansas Supreme Court first recognized a claim for false light publicity in Dodrill v.
Arkansas Democrat Co.475 The defendant newspaper had published a story
erroneously reporting that the plaintiff, an attorney whose law license had
been suspended, failed his required retake of the bar examination.476 The
plaintiff sued the newspaper for both defamation and false light invasion of
privacy.477 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on both claims, and the plaintiff appealed.478
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed summary judgment on the defamation claim, rejecting the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was a
public figure and could not prove the newspaper acted with actual malice.479
The court remanded that claim to the trial court with instructions to apply
the negligence standard of fault to the plaintiff’s defamation claim—whether
the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care before publishing the defamatory article.480 The court added that a finding of negligence would support
the defamation claim, but punitive damages could not be awarded in the
absence of a finding of actual malice.481
The court then turned to the summary judgment denying plaintiff’s privacy claim.482 After acknowledging the existence of the false light claim
under Arkansas law,483 the court affirmed for lack of evidence that the de475. 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979).
476. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
477. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 633, 590 S.W.2d at 842.
478. Id. at 631, 590 S.W.2d at 841.
479. Id. at 636–37, 590 S.W.2d at 844.
480. Id. at 637, 590 S.W.2d at 844.
481. Id., 590 S.W.2d at 844. Three of the seven justices dissented from the court’s ruling
reversing summary judgment on the defamation claim. They would have held that the plaintiff attorney was in fact a public figure because he held a position of public trust and had
breached that trust when suspended from the practice of law. Id. at 640–41, 590 S.W.2d at
846 (Hickman, J., joined by Smith & Holt, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters cautioned that the
majority’s ruling unduly constrained the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 641, 590 S.W.2d at 846.
482. Id. at 637, 590 S.W.2d at 844 (majority opinion).
483. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at 845.
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fendant either knowingly published the false information, or that the defendant acted with actual malice, defined as reckless disregard as to the truth or
falsity of the published material.484 The court apparently reasoned that even
if the plaintiff was not a public figure, he was still required to prove actual
malice to support his false light claim because the publication’s subject matter (whether or not a previously suspended lawyer qualified for readmission)
was a matter of public concern.485 Relying on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,486 the court held that the plaintiff had the burden to prove actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence.487 Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the
trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendant on the false
light claim.488
The Arkansas Supreme Court next addressed a false light claim in
Dodson v. Dicker.489 The defendant, a private citizen, had written a letter to
several state officials making disparaging remarks about the individual then
serving as president of the State Board of Therapy Technology and her
spouse, David Dicker.490 Mr. Dicker alone sued for defamation and false
light invasion of privacy.491 At trial, he won a jury award of $7,000 in actual
damages and $5,000 in punitive damages.492 On appeal, the court reversed,
holding that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict on both
claims.493 The court reasoned that nothing in the defendant’s letter to state
officials reasonably could be considered an assertion of objective fact, as
required to support a defamation claim.494
484. Id. at 638–39, 590 S.W.2d at 845–46 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E). The Eighth Circuit has held that actual malice in
this context means publication of false information with intent that the public construe the
information as factual. People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Publ’g,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1992).
485. See Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 639 & n.9, 590 S.W.2d at 845 & n.9 (observing that the
Supreme Court had retracted from Time, Inc. v. Hill with respect to defamation claims, thus
requiring only public figures to prove actual malice, but the Court had not revisited that issue
with respect to false light claims (citing Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245
(1974)).
486. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
487. Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 639, 590 S.W.2d at 845.
488. Id. at 639–40, 590 S.W.2d at 846.
489. 306 Ark. 108, 812 S.W.2d 97 (1991). The court acknowledged the claim in dicta in
Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 9, 678 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1984), which addressed an unsuccessful claim for intrusion on seclusion.
490. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 110, 812 S.W.2d at 97–98.
491. The plaintiff characterized the defamation claim as one for libel per se. Id., 812
S.W.2d at 98. Marinetta Dicker was not a party to the suit, perhaps because she was then a
public figure as president of the State Board of Therapy Technology. See id., 812 S.W.2d at
97.
492. Id., 812 S.W.2d at 98.
493. Id. at 110, 112, 812 S.W.2d at 98, 99.
494. Id. at 112, 812 S.W.2d at 99.
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With respect to the false light claim, the court observed that while Mr.
Dicker was not himself a public figure, the letter’s content addressed matters
of general public concern; therefore, the plaintiff was required to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had acted with actual malice in transmitting the letter.495 The court considered the evidence pertaining
to defendant’s subjective state of mind when she wrote the letter, concluding
that she had been motivated not by actual malice but rather her general dissatisfaction with the State Board’s operations.496 Under the circumstances,
the defendant’s First Amendment freedom of speech prevailed over the
plaintiff’s privacy concerns.497
As reflected in Dodrill and Dodson, a plaintiff may join defamation
and false light invasion of privacy claims in the same proceeding.498 However, the plaintiff may recover only once for any single publication.499 While
the claims are related, defamation remedies harm to one’s reputation, while
a false light claim redresses the emotional injury associated with publicity
casting the person in a false light.500 While required to support a defamation
claim, reputational harm is not required to support an invasion of privacy
claim for false light.501
The Eighth Circuit addressed a claim for false light invasion of privacy
in People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe International
Publishing, Inc.502 An elderly woman recovered a sizeable money judgment
against a tabloid publisher for portraying her as a pregnant 101-year old
woman.503 The publisher argued on appeal that the published story was obviously fictional, and therefore not actionable, because the content of the
495. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 113, 812 S.W.2d at 99 (citing Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co.,
265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979)); see also Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149
F. Supp. 2d 701, 707 (W.D. Ark. 2001) (citing Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840; People’s Bank & Trust v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1992)).
496. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 115, 812 S.W.2d at 100.
497. See id., 812 S.W.2d at 100.
498. Id., 812 S.W.2d at 98; Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at 845; see also WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 739 n.4, 74 S.W.3d 634, 656 n.4 (2002).
499. Dodson, 306 Ark. at 108, 812 S.W.2d at 98; Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638, 590 S.W.2d at
845 (citing, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (1977)).
500. See Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 10, 678 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1984). While the
Arkansas courts recognize false light invasion of privacy as a claim distinct from defamation,
they have also held that the defenses applicable to defamation claims apply as well to claims
for false light invasion of privacy and publicity given to private facts, which both require
publicity as a necessary element. E.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422, 423
(Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 652F to 652G).
501. See Dodson, 306 Ark. at 113, 812 S.W.2d at 99 (citing Dodrill, 265 Ark. 628, 590
S.W.2d 840; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E).
502. 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992).
503. Id. at 1067. The jury awarded her $650,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000
in punitive damages. Id.
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story was not reasonably believable.504 The court disagreed, holding that it
could not say as a matter of law that the story accompanying the plaintiff’s
photograph, when read as a whole, was not reasonably believable to readers
as conveying actual facts about the plaintiff, even though some would strain
credulity.505 Moreover, the court rejected the publisher’s argument that the
supermarket tabloid was obviously intended as fiction and therefore could
not support a claim for portraying the plaintiff in a false light.506 To the contrary, the court held that the tabloid’s style and format suggested the publisher’s intent that readers believe its material was factual.507 Therefore, the
story was a calculated falsehood that would support a remedy without implicating First Amendment considerations.508
Finally, the publisher challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding of actual malice.509 The court observed that mere failure to
investigate the accuracy of a published falsity is not sufficient.510 However,
“purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category.”511 In this case,
the editor who selected the photograph to accompany the story was aware
that it portrayed the plaintiff ten years earlier, but he assumed she had since
died.512 In 1980, the defendant’s editor had been working for the local newspaper when it published the same photograph to illustrate an accurate story
about the plaintiff.513 Under the circumstances, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant had
purposefully avoided the truth when it published the plaintiff’s photograph
to accompany a fabricated story.514
In two companion cases discussed earlier in this Article,515 the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed claims for false light invasion of privacy as
well as other privacy claims.516 In Lee, the court addressed the appellant’s
argument that the evidence failed to show actual malice.517 In doing so, the
504. Id. at 1068.
505. Id. at 1069.
506. Id. at 1069–70.
507. People’s Bank, 978 F.2d at 1070.
508. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
509. Id. at 1069–70.
510. Id. at 1070.
511. Id. (citing Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989)).
512. Id.
513. People’s Bank, 978 F.2d at 1070.
514. Id.
515. See supra notes 301–36 and accompanying text.
516. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002); Addington v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 105 S.W.3d 369 (2003). The claims for intrusion on
seclusion, also advanced in these cases based upon the defendant’s search of each plaintiff’s
property, were addressed in an earlier subsection of this Article. See supra notes 301–36 and
accompanying text.
517. Lee, 348 Ark. at 742–43, 74 S.W.3d at 658–59.
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court carefully sidestepped whether a private figure is required to prove actual malice in the first place when the facts publicized do not pertain to a
matter of public concern.518 Citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,519 the court
held that plaintiffs other than public figures need not prove actual malice to
recover for defamation.520 Nevertheless, noting that neither party had challenged the trial court’s jury instruction requiring proof of the elements by
clear and convincing evidence, the court reviewed the evidence with that
standard in mind.521 On the issue of actual malice, the record included clear
and convincing evidence, when viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, that
supported the finding of actual malice.522
In Addington, the court reached the opposite conclusion.523 The plaintiff’s false light claim was denied on summary judgment.524 On appeal, the
court upheld the disposition of that claim.525 The court reasoned that the
plaintiff failed to present evidence that the offending statements were
false.526 Even if they were, the court held that they were protected by qualified privilege.527 In this case, unlike in Lee, the court held that the defendant
had good reason to believe that Addington possessed property that was
rightfully the defendant’s, and therefore the plaintiff failed to overcome the
qualified immunity defense.528
518. Id. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 656–57. The Arkansas Model Jury Instructions
acknowledge that the Supreme Court has expressly left the issue open. See ARKANSAS MODEL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 cmt. (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013)
(citing Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634).
519. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
520. Lee, 348 Ark. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 657.
521. Id., 74 S.W.3d at 657.
522. Id. at 744, 74 S.W.3d at 659.
523. Addington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 454, 105 S.W.3d 369, 379
(2003).
524. Id. at 445, 105 S.W.3d at 373.
525. Id. at 454, 105 S.W.3d at 379. In doing so, however, the court erroneously held that
a plaintiff must prove the elements of the false light claim by clear and convincing evidence,
citing Dodrill. Addington, 81 Ark. App. at 452, 105 S.W.3d at 377. This statement is not
consistent with the holdings of the court in false-light claims. If applicable, the plaintiff must
prove only the element of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence to satisfy First
Amendment considerations announced in New York Times Co., Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). And in Lee, the jury was given an instruction erroneously requiring proof of every
element by clear and convincing evidence, but neither party challenged the instruction on
appeal. Lee, 348 Ark. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 657. No court in Arkansas has ever held that a
plaintiff must prove each required element of a claim for false light publicity by clear and
convincing evidence. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 (confirming that
only actual malice, if applicable, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; all other
elements require proof only by a preponderance of evidence).
526. Addington, 81 Ark. App. at 453, 105 S.W.3d at 378.
527. Id. at 453–54, 105 S.W.3d at 378–79. The qualified privilege defense is discussed
infra Part IV.G.3. and accompanying notes.
528. Id. at 454, 105 S.W.3d at 378–79.
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The most recent case addressing a claim for invasion of privacy by
false light publicity was Hobbs v. Pasdar.529 The plaintiff, the stepfather of
one of the three young murder victims in the case commonly known as the
“West Memphis 3,” sued the members of the Dixie Chicks, a singing group,
for defamation and false light invasion of privacy.530 The plaintiff challenged the veracity of a statement posted on the defendants’ website as well
as certain statements they had made at a fundraising rally implicating him in
the murders.531 After lengthy analysis, the trial court granted summary
judgment on both claims.532 The dispositive issue was whether the plaintiff
was a “limited purpose” public figure. The court reasoned that he was because he had voluntarily injected himself in various ways into the public
controversy regarding the murders.533 The court also correctly observed that
a limited purpose public figure must establish the element of actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence to substantiate a claim for either defamation or false light invasion of privacy.534
As the court observed, to establish actual malice requires “‘sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the Defendant, in fact, entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’”535 Because the plaintiff’s
evidence failed to support a finding of actual malice, the court granted
summary judgment on both claims.536
In summary, to support a claim for publicity casting plaintiff in a false
light under Arkansas law, the plaintiff must establish each of the following
elements: (1) damages, (2) publicity by the defendant given to a matter that
placed the plaintiff in a false light, (3) publicity pertaining to a matter that
would cause a reasonable person to justifiably feel seriously offended and
aggrieved, and (4) proximate cause.537 Each of these four elements must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence.538 In addition, for public
figures, or for publicity relating to a matter of public concern, the plaintiff

529. 682 F. Supp. 2d 909 (E.D. Ark. 2009). While the parties disputed whether Arkansas
or Tennessee law applied in that case, the court held that summary judgment was appropriate
no matter which state’s law applied. Id. at 925.
530. Id. at 909.
531. Id. at 912–14.
532. Id. at 932.
533. Id. at 926–30.
534. Id. at 930, 932 (citing Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 638–39, 590
S.W.2d 840, 845 (1979)).
535. Hobbs, 682 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (quoting Dodrill, 265 Ark. at 638–39, 590 S.W.2d at
845).
536. Id.
537. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on
Jury Instructions 2013).
538. Id.
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must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, meaning proof
that enables a conclusion without hesitation that the allegation is true.539
E.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Arkansas courts have not expressly held whether a party otherwise
aggrieved by an invasion of privacy may have a cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty as an alternative remedy. However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has held on several occasions that a party to a fiduciary relationship
may sue another party to that relationship for breach of a duty arising from
the nature of the relationship.540 Unlike a claim for invasion of privacy,
breach of fiduciary duty does not require proof of intentional conduct, at
least not when self-dealing is alleged.541
Many fiduciary relationships impose a duty of confidentiality.542 But
whether or not a breach of a specific duty of confidentiality may give rise to
a cause of action by a party aggrieved by the breach remains an open question in Arkansas. Other jurisdictions have held that a breach of a fiduciary’s
duty of confidentiality may support an action for damages for the resulting
harm, including emotional distress.543 The Arkansas Supreme Court has recently limited remedies in actions for breach of fiduciary duty; damages for
emotional distress unaccompanied by “quantifiable economic loss” are not
recoverable.544 Nevertheless, breach of fiduciary duty may be a proper basis
for recovery for disclosure of confidences, as long as the plaintiff sustains
some amount of pecuniary damages to accompany a claim for emotional
distress or mental anguish.
539. Id. Whether a plaintiff who is not a public figure and who claims invasion of privacy
by false light publicity pertaining to a matter not of public concern must prove actual malice
remains an open question in Arkansas by virtue of the court’s reasoning in Lee. See
ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 423 cmt. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee,
348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002)).
540. E.g., Sexton Law Firm, P.A. v. Milligan, 329 Ark. 285, 298, 948 S.W.2d 388, 395
(1997). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (“One standing in a
fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a
breach of duty imposed by the relation.”); ELDER, supra note 51, §§ 5:1–5.3.
541. Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 185–86, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2002) (“Self-dealing
breaches the fiduciary duty even when the action taken is innocent and unintentional.” (citing
Hosey v. Burgess, 319 Ark. 183, 890 S.W.2d 262 (1995))).
542. See generally ELDER, supra note 51, § 5:1. Whether a fiduciary duty exists in any
particular case is a question of law. See Long v. Lampton, 324 Ark. 511, 520, 922 S.W.2d
692, 698 (1996).
543. E.g., Fierstein v. DePaul Health Ctr., 24 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
544. See Rees v. Smith, 2009 Ark. 169, at 3–4, 301 S.W.3d 467, 471 (reversing jury
award of $10,000 for emotional distress based on alleged breach of fiduciary duty arising
from attorney-client relationship when defendant demanded sexual favors from plaintiff in
exchange for his continued legal representation).
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Remedies
1.

Damages

A plaintiff who successfully litigates a common law invasion of privacy claim in Arkansas may recover compensatory damages545 for mental anguish and pecuniary loss.546 Because all four privacy torts require proof of
intent, Arkansas law does not preclude an award of purely economic damages.547 Compensatory damages are not presumed; the plaintiff must demonstrate actual damages as an element of the privacy claim.548 However, once
the evidence establishes that the plaintiff sustained mental anguish, it is for
the jury to weigh the plaintiff’s feelings that might reasonably follow from
the intrusion.549 A court will not reverse a jury award of damages unless the
amount is “clearly the result of passion or prejudice, or so great as to shock
the conscience of the court.”550
The plaintiff may recover damages even if difficult to quantify, and expert testimony is not required.551 “Arkansas law has never insisted on exactness of proof in determining damages, and if it is reasonably certain that
some loss occurred, it is enough that damages can be stated only approximately.”552

545. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977).
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is entitled
to recover damages for
(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind
that normally results from such an invasion; and
(c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.
Id.
546. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 744, 74 S.W.3d 634, 660 (2002)
(upholding award of compensatory and punitive damages); AAA T.V. & Stereo Rentals, Inc.
v. Crawley, 284 Ark. 83, 84, 679 S.W.2d 190, 191 (1984) (affirming award of compensatory
and punitive damages for invasion of privacy in repossessing rented television).
547. Cf. Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 15, 385 S.W.3d 822, 832–
33 (declining to resolve whether purely economic losses may be recovered in negligence
actions).
548. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 419–423 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm.
on Jury Instructions 2013). On the other hand, a plaintiff may recover nominal damages for
the privacy invasion in the absence of proof of actual damages. Cf. Dunlap v. McCarty, 284
Ark. 5, 6, 678 S.W.2d 361, 362 (1984) (jury returned verdict for plaintiffs but awarded no
damages; judgment reversed on appeal on statute of limitations grounds).
549. See Crawley, 284 Ark. at 85, 679 S.W.2d at 191.
550. Id., 679 S.W.2d at 191 (citations omitted).
551. Agracat, Inc. v. AFS-NWA, LLC, 2010 Ark. App. 458, at 6–7, 379 S.W.3d 64, 68–
69 (citations omitted).
552. Id. at 7, 379 S.W.3d at 69.
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If the plaintiff secures an award of compensatory damages, punitive
damages are also available.553 However, nominal damages554 will not support
an award of punitive damages.555 To recover punitive damages for any claim
accruing on or after March 25, 2003, the plaintiff must establish by clear and
convincing evidence556 (1) that the defendant knew or should have known
that the conduct would naturally result in harm and nevertheless continued
the conduct with malice or reckless disregard as to the consequences, or (2)
that the defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct for the purpose
of causing harm.557 Assuming evidence is presented, the jury may consider
the defendant’s financial status in awarding punitive damages.558 Any punitive damage award is subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution.559 Under the Arkansas statute, punitive damages awards are subject to judicial scrutiny.560

553. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206 (Repl. 2003) (“In order to recover punitive damages
from a defendant, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages . . . .”); Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871,
879 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Hale v. Ladd, 308 Ark. 567, 571, 826 S.W.2d 244, 247 (1992));
Bell v. McManus, 294 Ark. 275, 277, 742 S.W.2d 559, 560 (1988); see Bayer CropScience
LP v. Schafter, 2011 Ark. 518, at 13, 385 S.W.3d 822, 831 (citations omitted) (“[P]unitive
damages are dependent upon the recovery of compensatory damages, as an award of actual
damages is a predicate for the recovery of punitive damages.”). For cases upholding punitive
damages awards for privacy torts, see Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe International Publishing, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding award of $850,000); Crawley, 284
Ark. at 84, 679 S.W.2d at 191 (upholding award of $15,000); CBM of Central Arkansas v.
Bemel, 274 Ark. 223, 623 S.W.2d 518 (1981) (upholding award of $4,000).
554. What constitutes a “nominal” award varies depending on the facts of each case. See
Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 933, 582 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1979) (citing Ray Dodge, Inc. v.
Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518 (1972)).
555. Id. at 933, 582 S.W.2d at 31 (citing Manhattan Credit Co. v. Skirvin, 228 Ark. 913,
311 S.W.2d 168 (1958)).
556. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “proof that enables [the jury] without
hesitation to reach a firm conviction that [an] allegation is true.” ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 2218 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013).
557. Id.; see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-206 to -211 (Repl. 2005) (governing punitive
damage awards). The Arkansas Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional section 16-55208, which capped punitive damages in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant intended to cause injury or damage. Bayer CropScience LP, 2011 Ark. at 13, 385
S.W.3d at 831.
558. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 2218; see Porter v. Lincoln, 282 Ark.
258, 261-B, 668 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1984); Bank of Cabot v. Ray, 279 Ark. 92, 94, 648 S.W.2d
800, 801 (1983).
559. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–18 (2003);
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994).
560. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-210 (referring to judicial duty to “[s]crutinize” all punitive
damage awards to ensure compliance with “applicable procedural, evidentiary, and constitutional requirements” and to “[o]rder remittitur where appropriate”).
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Injunctive Relief

In the early part of the twentieth century, before Arkansas courts recognized privacy torts, it was not uncommon to enjoin conduct that would
later support an invasion of privacy claim.561 The Arkansas Supreme Court
has long since abandoned the common law rule that equitable relief is not
available for infringements implicating only personal rights in the absence
of property damages, at least if the plaintiff has an inadequate remedy at
law.562 The cases are unclear, however, whether equitable relief remains
available to prevent disclosure of information pertaining to personal matters.
In one case, the Arkansas Supreme Court initially granted the plaintiff a
temporary restraining order to prevent disclosure of records but later dissolved it, holding that the specific records in question were not protected
under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.563
Common law relief for invasion of privacy is now well recognized in
Arkansas. Nevertheless, if a plaintiff can establish the traditional elements
supporting equitable relief, especially if the plaintiff’s remedy at law is inadequate or incomplete, the Arkansas courts would likely be amenable.564
However, an injunction that prevents publication or otherwise implicates the
First Amendment may be subject to challenge as a prior restraint.565
G.

Defenses
1.

Statute of Limitations

A variety of affirmative defenses may be asserted against claims for
invasion of privacy. Perhaps the most obvious is the statute of limitations. In
Arkansas, because a claim for invasion of privacy is not expressly enumerated in any other statute of limitations, the three-year “catchall” statute of
limitations for tort claims generally applies.566 However, the Arkansas Su561. E.g., Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957).
562. See id. at 295–96, 307 S.W.2d at 83–84.
563. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 225, 766 S.W.2d 909, 911
(1989).
564. See Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. v. TCB Transp., Inc., 312 Ark. 343, 345, 849
S.W.2d 509, 511 (1993) (mere existence of cause of action at law does not deprive court of
equity jurisdiction unless legal remedy is “clear, adequate, and complete” (quoting Honor v.
Yamuchi, 307 Ark. 324, 870 S.W.2d 267 (1991))).
565. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Mo. 2003). See generally ELDER,
supra note 51, § 6:15.
566. O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 317, 942 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1997) (“It has long
been the law in this state that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not
otherwise limited by law.” (citing Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934)));
see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-56-104 to -105 (Repl. 2005); Norris v. Bakker, 320 Ark. 629,
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preme Court has applied the one-year limitation period to bar a privacy
claim alleging an invasion solely based on two telephone conversations,
after declining to decide whether oral communications alone can support a
claim for invasion of privacy.567 Absent concealment of the wrong or other
tolling conduct, the limitation period begins to run when the wrongful act
occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers the wrongful nature of the conduct
itself.568
2.

Consent

As for other intentional torts, consent is generally an absolute defense
to a privacy claim.569 For intrusion on seclusion claims, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that consent negates the cause of action, so the
plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate that consent was lacking.570
As defined by the Arkansas Model Jury Instruction for intrusion on seclusion, the plaintiff’s burden of proof is particularly daunting. To establish the
claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “believed or was substantially certain that [he or she] lacked the necessary legal authority or personal
permission, invitation, or valid consent to commit the intrusive act.”571 The
standard appears to require proof of defendant’s subjective belief or certain-

631–32, 899 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1995); Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5, 10, 678 S.W.2d 361, 364
(1984).
567. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364–65 (holding that whether the alleged
intrusion amounted to defamation or intrusion on seclusion, it sought special damages based
on spoken words, to which the one-year statute of limitations applied).
568. Norris, 320 Ark. at 633, 899 S.W.2d at 71–72 (citing Hampton v. Taylor, 318 Ark.
771, 887 S.W.2d 535 (1994)).
569. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424 (Ark. Supreme Court Comm.
on Jury Instructions 2013). Similarly, a constitutional right of privacy may be waived. See
Pulaski Cnty. v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 220–21, 264 S.W.3d 465, 467–
68 (2007) (intervenor, a county contractor, waived any constitutional right of privacy she
may have had in the content of email messages to county official addressing both business
and personal matters).
570. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 (defining intentional intrusion
element to include proof that the defendant “believed or was substantially certain that [defendant] lacked the necessary legal authority or personal permission, invitation, or valid
consent to commit the intrusive act”); see also ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL
424 note on use (precluding use of consent instruction with ARKANSAS MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420 “since the absence of consent or other authority is part of a plaintiff’s burden of proof under such a claim”). The rationale may be that the claim rests on an
intrusion on the plaintiff’s seclusion, so a plaintiff must first establish an objective manifestation of a desire to maintain solitude or seclusion.
571. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420.
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ty that consent was lacking; proof of constructive knowledge or objective
awareness is not sufficient.572
Scholars have observed that the absence of consent is more accurately
described as an element of a privacy claim that the plaintiff must assert and
prove.573 While the distinction may appear to be academic, treating consent
as an affirmative defense eases the pleading burden on the plaintiff574 and
reduces the risk of a pre-answer dismissal for failure to allege non-consent.
Requiring proof of non-consent as an element of the intrusion claim puts the
burden on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s conduct was unauthorized.
Unlike some states’ laws,575 Arkansas law does not require written or
even express consent to avoid liability; consent may be either express or
implied by the plaintiff’s conduct or inaction.576 However, the plaintiff’s
consent must be voluntary, and it may be limited in scope. Consent is vitiated if the defendant exceeds the scope of the consent granted.577 Whether or
not the plaintiff consented is an issue of fact for the jury.578
3.

Qualified and Absolute Privilege

The defenses and privileges applicable to defamation claims apply
alike to privacy torts that require publicity as an element, specifically false

572. Contrast the requirement that the intrusion must be “highly offensive to a reasonable
person” as a result of defendant’s conduct that a “reasonable person” would find strongly
objectionable. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420. Under that standard, the
plaintiff’s subjective feelings about the intrusion are not relevant. Yet the plaintiff is required
to prove that the defendant subjectively believed he or she lacked valid consent to commit the
intrusion. Id.
573. E.g., ELDER, supra note 51, §§ 2:12, 3:9, 4:8, 6:6; see, e.g., Leggett v. First Interstate
Bank of Or., N.A., 739 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (“Strictly speaking, consent is
not a defense to invasion of privacy. Rather, lack of consent is an element of the tort . . . .”).
But see Green v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 242 S.W.3d 374, 379 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to hold that “lack of consent” is an element of a claim for appropriation of name or likeness).
574. As noted earlier, Arkansas is a fact-pleading state. ARK. R. CIV. P. 8.
575. An example is New York. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2009) (to
avoid liability, defendant must establish plaintiff’s written consent).
576. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424; see, e.g., Alexander v. Pathfinder,
189 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff failed to object when defendant’s employees
tape-recorded her conversations).
577. Wal-Mart Co., Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 727, 74 S.W.3d 634, 649 (2002) (holding
that plaintiff’s written and implied consent were not voluntary, and defendant’s conduct
exceeded the scope of plaintiff’s verbal consent).
578. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 424; Lee, 348 Ark. at 724, 74
S.W.3d at 647.

2013]

ARKANSAS RIGHT OF PRIVACY

505

light and publicity given to private facts.579 The corollary to this principle is
that those defenses do not bar either misappropriation of name or likeness or
intrusion on seclusion, neither of which require publicity or even publication
as an element.580 For example, a defendant who commits an intrusion on
seclusion may not assert absolute privilege as a defense on the rationale that
the intrusion was necessary to secure evidence to be offered in a pending
judicial proceeding.581 Whether a qualified privilege exists in a particular
context is a question of law.582 But once the court decides that the privilege
applies, it is a question of fact whether a particular statement is privileged.583
The Arkansas courts have seldom addressed qualified or absolute privileges in the privacy tort context. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered a qualified privilege defense in Lee in conjunction with the plaintiff’s claims for false light, intrusion, and defamation.584 In doing so, the
court concisely defined the defense and articulated its parameters:
“A communication is held to be qualifiedly privileged when it is made in
good faith upon any subject-matter in which the person making the
communication has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty,
and to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains matters which, without such privilege, would be actionable.” [T]he
qualified privilege must be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a
proper purpose and . . . does not extend to irrelevant defamatory statements that have no relation to the interest entitled to protection. The
qualified privilege is lost if it is abused by excessive publication; if the
statement is made with malice; or if the statement is made with a lack of
grounds for belief in its truthfulness. The question of whether a particular statement falls outside the scope of the qualified privilege for one of
these reasons is a question of fact for the jury.585

579. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652F-652G (1977); see also ARKANSAS
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 422 cmt., 423 cmt.
580. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420, 421; see also Froelich v.
Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973) (qualified privilege applicable to defamation claim
does not apply to claim for intrusion on seclusion, for which publication is not an element).
One scholar has criticized this position as “dubious” and inconsistent with the consensus in
other states that the set of qualified privileges applicable to defamation law generally applies
to all claims for invasion of privacy. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 2:13 (citations omitted).
581. See Froelich, 516 P.2d at 996.
582. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 409 cmt. (citing Minor v. Failla, 329
Ark. 274, 282, 946 S.W.2d 954, 958 (1997), overruled on other grounds, United Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Murphy, 331 Ark. 364, 961 S.W.2d 752 (1998)).
583. Id. (citing Lee, 348 Ark. at 724, 74 S.W.3d at 647).
584. Lee, 348 Ark. at 734–37, 743–44, 74 S.W.3d at 653–55, 659.
585. Id. at 735, 74 S.W.3d at 653–54 (quoting Minor, 329 Ark. at 283, 946 S.W.2d at
958–59) (other internal citations omitted); see also id. at 743–44, 74 S.W.3d at 659 (reiterating the same standard). The elements of the qualified privilege defense in the context of a
defamation claim are set out in ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 409.
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In Lee, the court concluded that the communications in question were
not privileged because the defendant’s agent who made the challenged
statements had no basis for believing they were truthful.586 But in Addington,
the Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment for the defendant
in a related claim, holding that the plaintiff failed to overcome the qualified
immunity defense with respect to his claims for false light invasion of privacy and defamation.587
The general definition of qualified privilege encompasses several more
specific variations.588 They include the reporter’s privilege (sometimes
known as the newsworthiness privilege), the fair-report privilege, and the
public records privilege. Each of these will be addressed in turn.
a.

Reporter’s privilege

A defendant is generally entitled to a qualified privilege for communications pertaining to public figures and matters of public concern.589 More
specifically, First Amendment considerations weigh especially heavily in
favor of news publishers and reporters. But unlike some other states’ laws,590
Arkansas law does not recognize absolute or qualified immunity for reporters or news media in defending defamation or privacy claims; nor does it
carve out any general exception for “newsworthy” publications.
In Williams v. American Broadcasting Cos.,591 the federal district court
addressed Arkansas substantive law governing news media privileges in the
context of a discovery dispute. A patient and her surgeon filed several tort
586. Lee, 348 Ark. at 737, 743, 74 S.W.3d at 655, 659.
587. Addington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 81 Ark. App. 441, 453–54, 105 S.W.3d 369,
378–79 (2003) (applying qualified privilege to affirm summary judgment on both false light
and defamation claims). However, the court reversed and remanded the intrusion on seclusion
claim, to which the qualified immunity defense did not apply. See id. at 457, 105 S.W.3d at
380 (holding that a fact question remained as to whether plaintiff’s consent was voluntary).
588. One variation on qualified immunity as a defense is the requirement that a false light
claim include proof of actual malice, at least when the challenged communication relates to
public figures and matters of public concern. See supra note 539 and accompanying text.
Because false light claims involving publicity raise First Amendment concerns, the qualified
immunity defense raises the burden of proof as a prerequisite for a claim seeking damages for
communications of the sort most likely to warrant First Amendment protection–those involving public figures and those pertaining to matters of public concern. Compare ARKANSAS
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 407 (providing jury instruction for defamation claim by
private figure plaintiff; requiring at minimum proof of negligence in failing to determine truth
of statement before publication) with ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 408
(providing jury instruction for defamation claim by public figure plaintiff, requiring clear and
convincing evidence that defendant published the defamatory fact “knowing it was false or
with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity”).
589. See supra notes 484–85, 539 and accompanying text.
590. See ELDER, supra note 51, §§ 3:17, 4:2.
591. 96 F.R.D. 658, 662 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
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claims against a news broadcaster and its reporter, including giving publicity
to private facts, defamation, and false light invasion of privacy.592 The defendants asserted the “reporters’ privilege” in an effort to avoid producing
the “out-takes” of videotape footage used in producing a television program.593
The court observed that no reporter’s privilege was recognized at
common law.594 The only reporter’s or newsman’s privilege ever recognized
under Arkansas law was based on a statute precluding the required disclosure of a reporter’s sources except under limited circumstances.595 But the
Arkansas courts have never adopted an expansive interpretation of the statutory privilege, and the federal court in Williams declined to do so, concluding that under Arkansas law, no reporter’s privilege applied to the film “outtakes.”596
Turning to the defendant’s argument asserting a constitutionally based
privilege, the court cited a United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in
acknowledging a limited constitutional basis for protecting newsmen against
disclosure of editorial processes.597 Yet that limited privilege had to give
way when “a member of the press is alleged to have circulated falsehood
and is sued for injury to the plaintiff’s reputation,” and the plaintiff seeks
evidence material to a “critical element” of the claim.598 The court reasoned
that any other conclusion would render plaintiffs powerless to prove actual
malice as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,599 or to prove malice
in order to recover punitive damages.600 The court concluded that the de592. Id. at 668–69. The false light and defamation claims were asserted by a surgeon who
claimed that the defendants had falsely portrayed him as engaging in unnecessary medical
procedures. Id. at 660. The other privacy claims were asserted by the patient, whose surgery
was filmed by the defendants without her knowledge or consent. The claims were consolidated by the court because they arose from the same set of facts. Id. at 662.
593. Id. at 660.
594. Id. at 663.
595. Id. at 662–63 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 43-917). The statutory privilege applies to
both civil and criminal proceedings. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 663 (citing Saxton v. Ark. Gazette Co., 264 Ark. 133, 135, 569 S.W.2d 115, 116 (1978)).
596. Id. at 663, 665.
597. Id. at 668–69 (discussing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)). The federal district court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in an unpublished opinion, recently suggested
that more stringent pleading requirements may apply to defamation claims against distributors of newspapers and magazines, i.e., “specific allegations of facts demonstrating either
actual knowledge of the tortious nature of the book or facts giving rise to a duty to investigate.” Steinbuch v. Hachette Book Grp., No. 4:08CV00456 JLH, 2009 WL 963588, at *3
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 8, 2009) (citing Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 465 (E.D. Cal. 1979)). In
the absence of such specific allegations, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for public
disclosure of private facts. Id. at *4.
598. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 670.
599. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
600. Williams, 96 F.R.D. at 670.
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fendant’s constitutional argument was inconsistent with the principle that
“malicious libelous utterances are not constitutionally protected.”601 Thus,
the plaintiff’s motions to compel production were granted.602
No Arkansas court since has cited Williams or otherwise addressed
whether a reporter or news organization has a qualified or absolute privilege
in the context of a privacy claim. The case has been cited with approval on
several occasions by other courts.
b.

Fair report privilege

Arkansas defamation law recognizes a privilege for “fair reporting” of
an official proceeding or public meeting.603 The privilege attaches with respect to the report of a proceeding or meeting, and a defendant is not liable
unless the plaintiff establishes that the publication exceeds the scope of the
privilege.604 The defendant exceeds the scope of the privilege if the published report does not accurately report the substance of the meeting or proceeding, and if the defendant fails to take steps reasonably necessary to insure the accuracy of the publication.605 The Arkansas courts have not addressed a privacy claim in which the defendants have asserted the fair report
privilege. However, the privilege would certainly apply to an invasion of
privacy claim for false light publicity to the same extent it applies to defamation.
c.

Public records privilege606

The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act607 generally provides for
public access to information contained in “public records,” broadly defined
as records “required by law to be kept” or “otherwise kept and which constitute a record of the performance” or nonperformance of “official func-

601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Arkansas Model Jury Instructions refer to the qualified privilege defense as the “fair
report” privilege. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 410 & cmt. (Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013) (citing, e.g., Whiteside v. Russellville Newspaper, Inc., 2009 Ark. 135, at 6–7, 295 S.W.3d 798, 801–02).
604. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 410. The instruction is modeled after
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977).
605. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 410; see Whiteside, 2009 Ark. at 6–7,
295 S.W.3d at 801 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611).
606. See ELDER, supra note 51, § 3:15 n.31.
607. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-103 to -110 (Supp. 2011).
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tions.”608 The Arkansas courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the
statute is to be liberally interpreted in favor of disclosure.609
However, just because information is in a public record does not preclude a cause of action for invasion of privacy; nor does it bar assertion of a
constitutional, statutory, or common law privacy interest in the information.
For one thing, the Act includes a number of exceptions barring access to
certain kinds of records.610 Moreover, to the extent that an individual asserts
a constitutional or other privacy interest in information contained in public
records, the public’s interest in the records must be balanced against the
individual privacy interests.611 As might be expected, an individual’s privacy
interest in particular public records and the information they contain varies
depending on a number of factors,612 including the government’s purpose in
maintaining the records and the public’s interest in accessing them.613
An individual’s criminal history records are almost always exempt
from privacy claims, even information pertaining to arrestees who have not
been convicted of any offense. The earliest Arkansas case was Mabry v.
Kettering.614 Arrestees sought to preclude federal law enforcement officials
from publishing their photographs and distributing them nationwide.615 Citing a number of cases from other jurisdictions, the court held that law enforcement officers may use photographs of those in custody who have been
charged with a crime for the purpose of identifying the accused.616 Even
records pertaining to unsubstantiated and unfounded administrative reports
608. Id. § 25-19-103(1).
609. E.g., Bryant v. Weiss, 335 Ark. 534, 538, 983 S.W.2d 902, 904 (1998).
[T]he intent of the Freedom of Information Act was to establish the right of the
public to be fully apprised of the conduct of public business. As a rule, statutes
enacted for the public benefit are to be interpreted most favorably to the public.
The Freedom of Information Act was passed wholly in the public interest and is
to be liberally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy purposes may be
achieved.
Id. (citing, e.g., City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 184–85, 801 S.W.2d 275, 278
(1990)).
610. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b).
611. McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 231, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915
(1989) (citing Nixon v. Adm’r. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977)).
612. See id., 766 S.W.2d at 915 (observing that the plaintiff’s privacy interest in nondisclosure varied among the items she sought to prevent defendants from releasing).
613. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has rejected an attorney’s argument that
the attorney-client privilege provides a basis for an exception to disclosure of public records
under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 225–26, 766 S.W.2d at 912 (attorneyclient privilege is a rule of evidence only and does not provide an exception to a substantive
act requiring disclosure of public records).
614. 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746 (1909); see also Mabry v. Kettering, 92 Ark. 81, 122
S.W. 115 (1909) (second appeal).
615. Mabry, 89 Ark. at 551–52, 117 S.W. at 746.
616. Id. at 553, 117 S.W. at 747.
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of possible child abuse may not be subject to an individual’s privacy claim if
a statute requires the information to be included in a public registry, and if
sufficient statutory safeguards are in place to protect the individual’s privacy
interests.617
While the accused may have only a limited privacy interest, if any, in
criminal history records, family members of the accused may have a legitimate interest in preventing the release of criminal investigation records implicating matters personal to them. In McCambridge v. City of Little Rock,
the court recognized that the plaintiff had a constitutional privacy interest in
certain criminal investigation records relating to her son’s murder-suicide.618
But the court also emphasized that the public had a strong interest in having
access to records relevant to solving crime.619 In balancing those interests,
the court concluded that the public’s interest in the records outweighed the
mother’s constitutional privacy interests.620
The Arkansas courts have repeatedly held that exceptions to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act must be narrowly construed.621 The several
exceptions to the Act include “[p]ersonnel records to the extent that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy[,]”622 and “[m]edical records, adoption records, and education records as
defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 . . . unless their disclosure is consistent with the provisions of that [federal] act.”623
Both exceptions protect against the disclosure of records that implicate important individual privacy concerns with respect to employment, medical
care, family relationships, and educational matters. A full discussion of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, each of these

617. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Heath, 312 Ark. 206, 215, 848 S.W.2d 927, 932
(1993).
618. McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 230, 766 S.W.2d at 914.
619. Id. at 231, 766 S.W.2d at 915.
620. Id. at 232–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915; cf. Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 598, 826 S.W.2d
252, 255 (1992) (holding that personnel record exception in Arkansas Freedom of Information Act requires weighing public's right to knowledge of records against individual right
to privacy).
621. E.g., Thomas v. Hall, 2012 Ark. 66, at 13, 399 S.W.3d 387, 395. “[T]his court has
consistently held that it interprets exceptions to the FOIA narrowly and in favor of disclosure.
Ambiguous exemptions will be interpreted in a manner favoring disclosure.” Id., 399 S.W.3d
at 395 (citation omitted). The party seeking to avoid disclosure has the burden of proof that
the information is within the scope of an exception. See Stilley v. McBride, 332 Ark. 306,
313, 965 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1998).
622. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(12) (Supp. 2011); see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (Supp.
2011).
623. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2).
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two exceptions has been the subject of litigation and considerable public
debate.624
4.

Other Statutory Defenses

Specific statutes may permit conduct that might otherwise support a
claim for invasion of privacy, and therefore may be asserted in defense. For
example, a party to a cordless or cell phone communication may record it,
even without the knowledge of the other party to the call.625
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Arkansas privacy law has evolved considerably since the Arkansas Supreme Court first recognized the common law right of privacy fifty years
ago. The development of the state’s right of privacy, grounded both in
common law and the Arkansas Constitution, is largely attributable to the
courts; the Arkansas General Assembly has taken a relatively low profile in
the development of the civil right of privacy. This section identifies legal
issues related to the right of privacy that Arkansas policymakers have not
yet resolved.
A.

Misappropriation of Name or Likeness

While the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a judgment for misappropriation of name or likeness in Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd,626 no Arkansas appellate court, then or since, has had an opportunity to directly con624. E.g., Stilley, 332 Ark. at 314, 965 S.W.2d at 128–29 (precluding disclosure under
personnel records exception of police officers’ home addresses; purpose of Act is to keep
electors advised of performance of public officials and to enable them to learn and to report
on public officials’ activities); Young, 308 Ark. at 598, 826 S.W.2d at 255 (interpreting
“clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” to preclude disclosure of examination
results of other candidates for promotion to police lieutenant); see Ark. Gazette Co. v. So.
State Coll., 273 Ark. 248, 251, 620 S.W.2d 258, 260 (1981) (“No one has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the amount of public funds dispersed [sic] to him [by a public educational institution] unless that person clearly comes within one of the exceptions [to
the Arkansas FOIA] which by law are required to be closed to the public.”); cf. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004) (interpreting analogous exceptions in federal act with respect to Vince Foster suicide). Exceptions to the Arkansas Freedom
of Information Act have been the subject of a host of Arkansas Attorney General opinions.
E.g., Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2011-152 (personnel records); Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2012083 (educational records).
625. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(a) (Repl. 2005) (not unlawful for one party to record a
conversation, with or without other party’s consent); see Alexander v. Pathfinder, 189 F.3d
735, 743 (8th Cir. 1999).
626. 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962).
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sider this privacy claim. In recognizing other privacy torts, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on the applicable provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that define the elements of each claim. Accordingly, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions generally follow the Restatement definitions.627
Under the Restatement definition, a claim for misappropriation of name
or likeness requires proof that the defendant used the plaintiff’s name or
likeness for the defendant’s advantage. As in Olan Mills, in which the defendant used the plaintiff’s studio photographs without authorization to advertise its photography services, the cause of action sometimes seeks a remedy for a defendant’s commercial use of one’s identity. Yet the Restatement
explicitly provides that commercial use is not required.628 Some states, like
New York, have enacted statutes restricting the cause of action to situations
involving commercial use.629 The Arkansas right of privacy, however, is
governed by common law alone, and the state courts have never undertaken
to limit recovery to situations involving a defendant’s commercial use.
In two cases, however, the federal courts have erroneously assumed
that the cause of action requires the plaintiff to prove commercial use by the
defendant.630 To the contrary, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions adopt
the broader definition of the claim as set forth in the Restatement.631 The
comment to the model jury instruction muddies the issue by observing that
the federal district court “confirmed” that the tort requires commercial
use.632 But no Arkansas court has ever held that appropriation of name or
likeness is actionable only if the defendant engages in commercial use of the
plaintiff’s identity. Nor has the Arkansas General Assembly enacted any
statute so limiting the cause of action.
627. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 420–424 (Ark. Supreme Court
Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013).
628. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
The common form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff's name or likeness to advertise the defendant's
business or product, or for some similar commercial purpose. Apart from statute,
however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation. It applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own
purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even
though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one. Statutes in some
states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of the name or
likeness.
Id. (emphasis added).
629. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009).
630. LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 899 (E.D.
Ark. 2011); Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (W.D. Ark.
2001).
631. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 421 & cmt.
632. Id. (citing Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d 701).
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The claim for invasion of privacy by misappropriation of name or likeness is correctly defined in Arkansas Model Jury Instruction 421 to require
use for the defendant’s advantage, which need not be a commercial one.633
B.

The Right of Publicity

In many states, the courts and legislatures have explicitly acknowledged considerable evolution in the common law right to damages for misappropriating one’s name or likeness for the defendant’s benefit. In the early
years, only private individuals could pursue a common law action to redress
emotional injury for invasion of privacy. Most courts considered public officials and public figures to have waived any right to privacy, or at least to
have implicitly consented to invasions of privacy when they elected to join
the public arena.
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, however, many courts began
to acknowledge the property interests of celebrities in protecting the economic value of their public personas.634 The traditional common law right to
recover damages for invasion of “privacy” by misappropriation of one’s
identity thus evolved to what is now better known as the “right of publicity.”635 A plaintiff seeking redress for violation of the right of publicity may
recover for the economic loss associated with the defendant’s use.
No court, state or federal, has addressed whether Arkansas recognizes
the common law right of publicity.636 In other states, the right of publicity
has become such a frequent matter of litigation that several legislatures have
enacted specific statutes governing the right.637 Some states treat the right as
an expansion of the privacy right against misappropriation of name or like633. Compare id. (requiring proof that the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s name or likeness
was for defendant’s “own purposes or benefit, commercial or otherwise”) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (stating that the prohibited use “is not limited to commercial appropriation”).
634. E.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
1983) (applying Michigan law); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 491–
92 (3d Cir. 1956) (interpreting Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York law).
635. See generally Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A “Haystack in a Hurricane,” 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977 (1982) (describing evolution of the right of publicity).
636. But see Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 199, 203 & n.9 (2002) (erroneously suggesting that Arkansas adopted the common law
right of publicity in Olan Mills). Olan Mills did not assert the right of publicity. See Olan
Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 496–97, 353 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1962). The plaintiff
was neither a celebrity nor a public figure; she was a private person. Id. at 495, 353 S.W.2d at
22. Nor did she seek compensation for the economic value of her photograph as used by the
defendant; rather, she sought damages for emotional injury. Id. at 496, 353 S.W.2d at 23.
Olan Mills was simply a classic privacy claim seeking damages for mental anguish as a result
of the defendant’s misappropriation of her likeness.
637. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2013).
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ness, but in fact it redresses a different kind of injury altogether.638 Many
courts cite the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition639 as the basis for
the common law right of publicity.640 Neither the Arkansas General Assembly nor the Arkansas courts have addressed the issue.
C.

Descendibility

A related issue is whether a claim for violation of the right of privacy,
or any of its variations, survives a plaintiff who dies before securing a
judgment awarding damages. Most states recognize privacy as a right personal to the plaintiff.641 Like other personal rights, in most states the right
does not survive the plaintiff642 and is not heritable unless a state statute preserves the right to the plaintiff’s estate.643
The issue of descendibility has been litigated frequently over the last
decade as the early generations of mass media celebrities pass away, leaving
substantial economic value in their surviving public identities. For example,
Elvis Presley and Marilyn Monroe have been the subjects of extensive litigation and even legislation addressing the descendibility of the economic
value of their celebrity identities.644 The premature death of Michael Jackson
is another illustration that issues involving descendibility of publicity rights
are likely to multiply with future generations of celebrities.645

638. Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights
for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1606–07
(2001) (describing different interests protected by the two torts).
639. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
640. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003).
641. ELDER, supra note 51, § 1:3.
642. See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895). “Whatever right of privacy
Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights, in the legal sense of that
term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler died, her own individual right of privacy, whatever it may
have been, expired at the same time.” Id.; see also Clift v. Narrangansett Television LP, 688
A.2d 805, 814 (R.I. 1996) (“[T[he right to privacy dies with the person.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977).
643. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b.
644. E.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (likeness of Elvis Presley); Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (name, image, and voice of Marilyn Monroe).
645. See, e.g., Robert C. O’Brien & Bela G. Lugosi, Update to the Commercial Value of
Rights of Publicity: A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words . . . or Sometimes a Million Dollars, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. (No. 3, Fall 2009); see also Erin K. Mai, Comment, “‘Cause
This is Thriller!”: The True Price of Fame and an Analysis of the Current System for Calculating Estate Taxes on the Post-Mortem Right of Publicity, 3 EST. PLANNING & COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 1, 1 (2010).
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Several states have enacted legislation to address the descendibility issue.646 Those state statutes that allow the right of publicity to survive vary
widely as to the length of time the right survives the decedent.647 Arkansas
has yet to address whether claims for invasion of privacy by misappropriation of name or likeness survive the plaintiff.
In Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center, the Arkansas Supreme Court followed the majority rule against survivability of a claim for
intrusion on seclusion,648 even though the Arkansas survival statute generally provides that claims for personal injury survive the decedent.649 The
Cannady court held that the right of privacy is generally personal to the
plaintiff and therefore does not survive the plaintiff’s death.650 However, in
dicta the court observed that the Restatement makes an exception for privacy claims for misappropriation of name or likeness, at least to the extent that
an invasion may implicate a property interest.651 Thus the issue remains
open with respect to other privacy torts, especially those that implicate economic interests. Cannady decided only that claims for intrusion on seclusion, which generally seek a remedy for mental anguish and emotional distress rather than economic loss, do not survive the plaintiff.652
D.

Invasion of Privacy by Oral Communications Alone

In Dunlap v. McCarty,653 the plaintiffs claimed damages for intrusion
on seclusion based on two telephone conversations between the parties. The
appellate court reversed a judgment for the plaintiffs and an award of nominal damages on statute of limitations grounds, applying the one-year limitation period applicable to “actions for words spoken whereby special damag-

646. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-208
(LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1448 (2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002
(West 2000); cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (LexisNexis 2010) (although traditional
right of privacy terminates upon death, the right of publicity, which protects one’s personality
from commercial exploitation, survives).
647. Compare, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g) (West 1997) (70 years) with 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8316(c) (West 2007) (30 years).
648. 2012 Ark. 369, ___ S.W.3d ___.
649. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2005). Based on the plain language of the
statute, the only exceptions are claims for slander and libel. See id. § 16-62-101(a)(2). Nevertheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted “personal injury” claims strictly to preclude survival of personal injury claims not involving physical injury.
650. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___ S.W.2d at ____.
651. Id., ___ S.W.2d at ___ (distinguishing Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961 P.2d 333 (Wash.
1998)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977).
652. Cannady, 2012 Ark. at 8, ___ S.W.2d at ___.
653. 284 Ark. 5, 6, 678 S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (1984).
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es are sustained.”654 In passing, however, the court expressed skepticism
about invasion of privacy claims based solely on oral communications, noting that other state courts were divided on the issue.655 The court specifically
declined to address “whether mere oral communications can be the basis of
a claim for invasion of privacy”656 because it was not necessary to reach the
issue.
While the court has never revisited the issue, the “oral publication limitation” referenced by the Dunlap court, once recognized by a slim minority
of early courts, has been rejected by the great majority as antiquated and
lacking rational justification.657 The clear consensus of the decisions addressing the issue rejects any such distinction based on the means of communication. For example, several cases in other jurisdictions have considered debt collection practices often involving verbal telephone harassment.658 Nevertheless, the issue remains unresolved by the Arkansas courts.
E.

False Light Publicity Claims by Private Plaintiffs Not Implicating Matters of Public Concern

Because privacy claims alleging publicity portraying the plaintiff in a
false light may implicate First Amendment concerns, the United States Supreme Court has imposed additional requirements on public figures who
seek to recover damages and on private persons who seek to recover for
false light publicity involving matters of public concern.659 Specifically, the
Court has held that to recover damages, a public figure must establish that
654. Id. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1983) (current
version ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-104(4) (Repl. 2005)). Read in context, this specific language suggests that the General Assembly sought to apply a one-year statute of limitations to
slander per quod, which requires proof of special damages. A separate subsection 16-56104(3) applies a one-year statute of limitations to “words spoken slandering the character of
another,” id., known at common law as slander per se, see United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Murphy,
331 Ark. 364, 368–69, 961 S.W.2d 752, 755 (1998). The Arkansas Supreme Court abolished
the distinction between defamation per se and defamation per quod in 1998, holding that
reputational injury or “special damages” must be shown to recover an award of damages in
any action for defamation. Id. at 370, 961 S.W.2d at 756.
655. Dunlap, 284 Ark. at 9–10, 678 S.W.2d at 364.
656. Id. at 10, 678 S.W.2d at 364.
657. ELDER, supra note 51, § 1:2.
658. See, e.g., Dawson v. Assocs. Financial Servs. Co. of Kan., Inc., 529 P.2d 104, 111
(Kan. 1974) (finding that debt collection phone calls may amount to intrusion on seclusion
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B cmt. d (1977) (“[W]hen the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and
frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, . . . his privacy is invaded.”).
659. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967) (applying to false light privacy
claim the standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1976), for
defamation claims by public figures).
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the defendant acted with actual malice.660 In addition, if the publicity involves a matter of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must overcome
constitutional concerns by meeting a higher burden of proof, although the
extent of that burden has not been clearly delineated.661
The issue not yet resolved by the federal courts is whether a private
plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover damages for false light invasion of privacy pertaining to a matter not of legitimate public concern.662 At
least one scholar has predicted that First Amendment restrictions do not
apply to private individuals who allege an invasion of privacy by false light
publicity not involving a matter of public interest.663 However, the Eighth
Circuit, applying Arkansas law, held in 1992 that even a private plaintiff
must establish actual malice to recover damages for false light invasion of
privacy, even though the publicity did not involve a matter of legitimate
public concern.664 More recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly left
the question open in Lee, pointedly noting that neither party had objected to
the jury instructions requiring the private plaintiff to prove actual malice.665
F.

Scope of Familial and Relational Privacy Rights

Both state and federal courts have acknowledged that the right of privacy implicates familial and relational interests.666 For example, in
660. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 283.
661. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E Caveat; ELDER, supra note 51, § 4:13.
662. See, e.g., West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 647–48 (Tenn.
2001) (adopting simple negligence standard for private plaintiff/private matter false light
claims in light of United States Supreme Court’s “uncertain position . . . with respect to the
constitutional standard for false light claims brought by private individuals about matters of
private interest”); ELDER, supra note 51, § 4:13, at 4-155 (“In private person-non-public
interest cases the law is undeveloped.”).
663. ELDER, supra note 51, § 4:13, at 4-156; see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (holding Gertz restrictions generally inapplicable to
private plaintiffs alleging defamation not involving a matter of public interest).
664. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Mountain Home v. Globe Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 978
F.2d 1065, 1067–68 & n.2 (reasoning that proof of actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence was required by Arkansas law).
665. Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 740, 74 S.W.3d 634, 657 (2002). “[T]he
effect of the Gertz decision upon the Court's holding in Time, Inc. v. Hill has been left in a
state of uncertainty. For this reason, the American Law Institute added a caveat to section
652E leaving open the question of whether there may be liability based upon a showing of
negligence as to truth or falsity.” Lee, 348 Ark. at 740, 74 S.W.3d at 657 (citations omitted).
666. E.g., Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, at 9–10, ___
S.W.3d ___, ___; McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 230, 766 S.W.2d 909,
914 (1989); Alexander v. Pathfinder, 189 F.3d 735, 742–43 (8th Cir. 1999) (mother raised
privacy interests of her disabled son when her conversations with him in his room were audiotaped); see also Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167–69 (2004)
(observing that family of Vince Foster had legitimate interest in protecting photographs of
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McCambridge,667 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the mother of a
murder-suicide victim had a constitutional privacy interest in restricting
disclosure of certain documents, including a letter her son had written to her
before he died.668 Similarly, in a federal Freedom of Information Act case,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the surviving family
members of suicide victim Vince Foster could assert their own privacy interests in seeking to limit public disclosure of photographs of the deceased.669 The Court relied in part on the “well-established cultural tradition” acknowledging the family’s right to control the disposition of the remains and to limit the use of photographs of the body, which had “long been
recognized at common law.”670 The Court also emphasized, however, that
the privacy interests acknowledged by certain exceptions to the Freedom of
Information Act go beyond the common law right of privacy.671
The Arkansas Supreme Court has expressly and repeatedly acknowledged familial and relational privacy interests in recognizing a state constitutional right of privacy.672 The constitutional right protects the privacy of
sexual relationships between consenting adult partners,673 as well as eligibility to become foster parents regardless of marital status or sexual orientation.674 The constitutional privacy interest recently led a divided court to
reverse a criminal conviction of a high school teacher for engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with an adult student.675 On the other hand, the
Arkansas Supreme Court recently rejected a mother’s privacy claim asserting that her own right of privacy was violated when hospital employees violated federal criminal law by viewing photographs of her daughter, the vic-

suicide victim from public disclosure). But see Boyd v. Thomson Newspaper Publ’g Co., 6
Media L. Rep. 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (rejecting privacy interests asserted by parents
for newspaper’s unauthorized publication of name of their deceased child).
667. 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909.
668. Id. at 230–32, 766 S.W.2d at 914–15.
669. Favish, 541 U.S. at 171 (“[P]ersonal privacy protected by [FOIA] Exemption 7(C)
extends to family members who object to the disclosure of graphic details surrounding their
relative's death. . . .”).
670. Id. at 169 (citing, e.g., McCambridge, 298 Ark. at 231–32, 766 S.W.2d at 915).
671. Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
672. E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 15, 380 S.W.3d 429,
437 (acknowledging right of sexual cohabiters to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy in the privacy of their homes without prohibiting them from parenting by adoption or foster care); Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 632, 80 S.W.3d 332, 350
(2002) (recognizing “fundamental right to privacy implicit in [Arkansas] law protect[ing] all
private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy between adults”).
673. Jegley, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
674. Cole, 2011 Ark. at 21, 380 S.W.3d at 440.
675. Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, at 15, 388 S.W.3d 429, 438.
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tim of a brutal rape, who later died of injuries inflicted by her assailant.676
The court refused to recognize a common law relational privacy interest,
rejecting the reasoning of courts in a minority of other states that have allowed recovery in analogous circumstances.677
The Arkansas Supreme Court has been progressive in interpreting the
state constitution to limit government invasions of relational and familial
privacy interests. Yet the court has been much less inclined to recognize
common law remedies against nongovernmental defendants for violation of
familial and relational privacy interests. It remains to be seen whether the
Arkansas Supreme Court will reconcile the two lines of cases, or whether
the Arkansas General Assembly will enact legislation to address the issue.
G.

Scope of the Arkansas Constitutional Right of Privacy

The most recent privacy law cases issued by the Arkansas Supreme
Court illustrate a division among the justices concerning the scope of the
fundamental right of privacy implicit in the Arkansas Constitution. In 2002,
the court unanimously recognized in Jegley v. Picado that the constitutional
right protects consensual sexual relationships between consenting adults,
barring prosecution of gay and lesbian couples for violating the Arkansas
criminal sodomy statute.678 Not long after, the court rejected an argument
that mandatory DNA sampling for non-violent felons violated the state constitutional right of privacy.679 In dicta, the court distinguished Jegley, suggesting that the state constitutional right to privacy applied only to intimate
sexual activity in one’s home.680
In 2006, the court struck down a regulation of the Arkansas Child Welfare Agency Review Board declaring that no person who lives in a household with an adult homosexual may qualify as a foster parent.681 The majority declined to reach the privacy issue, reasoning that the Board lacked statutory authority to adopt the regulation because it had not been shown to promote the health, safety, and welfare of children.682 But Justice Brown concurred separately, noting that he would have reached the privacy issue. He
676. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, at 10, ___ S.W.3d ___,
___. However, the court reinstated the mother’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 10–11, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
677. See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Hwy. Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 2010); Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959); Reid v. Pierce Cnty., 961
P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).
678. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. at 632, 80 S.W.3d at 350.
679. Polston v. State, 360 Ark. 317, 201 S.W.3d 406 (2005).
680. Id. at 332, 201 S.W.2d at 414 (dicta).
681. Dep’t of Human Servs. & Child Welfare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, 367 Ark.
55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006).
682. Id. at 65, 238 S.W.3d at 8.
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reasoned that the regulation violated the constitutional privacy right of prospective foster parents “attending sexual conduct in the bedroom between
two consenting adults.”683
In 2011, the court unanimously extended the scope of the constitutional
right of privacy to protect the right of unmarried cohabiting sexual partners
to decide whether to become foster parents.684 The unanimous court reasoned that cohabiting sexual partners, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
should have the right to decide whether to become parents.685 The court
struck down Act I because it automatically barred same-sex cohabiting couples from becoming foster parents as a matter of law, even if they otherwise
met the qualifying criteria.686
The diverging perspectives on the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding
the scope of the fundamental privacy right were revealed most clearly in
2012 in Paschal v. State,687 in which a slim majority reversed the conviction
of a high school teacher for violating an Arkansas statute prohibiting a public schoolteacher from engaging in sexual contact with a student under age
twenty-one. The conduct that led to the teacher’s prosecution was a consensual relationship with an eighteen-year-old student.688 The majority reversed
the conviction, holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to
Paschal.689 The three dissenting justices narrowly interpreted the right of
privacy grounded in the Arkansas Constitution to protect only “a right to
privacy . . . for consenting adults to have sexual relations in the privacy of
their homes.”690 The dissenters would have upheld Paschal’s conviction,
reasoning that his conduct indisputably violated the criminal statute and did
not implicate the fundamental right of privacy.691
In summary, the Arkansas Supreme Court unanimously embraces the
principle that the Arkansas Constitution guarantees a fundamental right of
privacy with respect to consensual adult sexual relationships. However, the
parameters of that right remain unclear, undoubtedly inviting continued litigation.692 It remains to be seen whether a majority of the Arkansas Supreme
Court will continue to extend the right to any adult consensual sexual relationship, with a focus on personal autonomy to engage in consensual sexual
683. Id. at 70, 238 S.W.3d at 11 (Brown, J., concurring).
684. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 26, 380 S.W.3d 429, 443.
685. Id. at 18–19, 380 S.W.3d at 439.
686. Id. at 24–25, 380 S.W.3d at 442.
687. 2012 Ark. 127, 388 S.W.3d 429.
688. Id. at 3, 388 S.W.3d at 432.
689. Id. at 11–12, 388 S.W.3d at 436.
690. Id. at 19, 388 S.W.3d at 440 (emphasis added) (Brown, J., joined by Gunter &
Baker, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
691. Id. at 22–23, 388 S.W.3d at 441–42.
692. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, “‘[o]bscure’ might best describe the [constitutional] right of privacy.” Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 2006).
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relationships; or whether the court’s policy focus is to protect the right of
cohabiting partners and their families to make personal decisions, in the
setting of the home, about how they conduct their daily lives.
H.

Private Civil Claims for Invasion of Privacy Based on Violation of
Criminal Statutes

Under the Arkansas crime victims civil liability statute,693 criminal
conduct that would amount to a felony offense under Arkansas law may
support a civil cause of action for damages by any person harmed by the
defendant’s conduct.694 If the person dies, the cause of action survives and
may be filed on behalf of the estate.695 First enacted in 1997, the crime victims civil liability statute was amended in 2011 to exclude criminal abuse of
adults696 and Medicaid fraud.697 Otherwise, conduct defined by Arkansas
law as a felony may be the factual basis for a civil claim, whether or not the
offender is prosecuted for the criminal offense. Only a preponderance of the
evidence is required to prove each element of the claim, and a prevailing
plaintiff may recover attorney fees and costs as well as damages. 698
To date, no published decision has relied on the crime victims civil liability statute to support a civil claim redressing invasion of privacy. But the
Arkansas General Assembly has recently enacted several criminal statutes
addressing such privacy-related offenses as identity fraud, computer fraud,
breach of privacy, and similar offenses. The elements of these novel criminal offenses may or may not squarely fit within the elements of the four
traditional variations on the common law right of privacy. Therefore, the
crime victims civil liability statute may offer an alternative basis for asserting a claim for invasion of privacy beyond the four privacy torts recognized
by Arkansas common law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognizes that a statutory claim and a
common law claim seeking damages for the same injury may be asserted in
the same action.699

693. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107 (Supp. 2011).
694. Id. § 16-118-107(a)(1); see LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776
F. Supp. 2d 886, 903 & n.7 (E.D. Ark. 2011) (holding that plaintiff stated facially plausible
claim for civil recovery under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107 alleging violation of Arkansas
criminal forgery statute).
695. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107(a)(2)–(3).
696. Id. §§ 5-28-101 to -110 (Repl. 2005 & Supp. 2011).
697. Id. §§ 5-55-101 to -114 (Repl. 2005 & Supp. 2011).
698. Id. § 16-118-107(a)(2)–(3).
699. See Koch v. Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC, 361 Ark. 192, 202, 205 S.W.3d
754, 762 (2005) (holding that jury was entitled to reach conflicting results in relation to ordinary negligence claim and statutory claim, which were distinct).
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Arkansas felony criminal offenses within the scope of the crime victims civil liability statute include voyeurism,700 video voyeurism,701 financial
identity fraud,702 stalking,703 residential704 or commercial burglary,705 forgery,706 criminal impersonation,707 computer fraud,708 computer trespass,709
unlawful acts involving electronic mail,710 and computer password disclosure,711 among others. Moreover, another Arkansas statute specifically authorizes a civil cause of action for damages, including loss of profits, by any
person injured by the commission of certain computer-related crimes,
whether or not classified as felony offenses.712
Arkansas common law has long recognized that a violation of a statute
or ordinance may be considered by the factfinder as evidence of negligence.713 Because invasion of privacy generally has been considered an intentional tort, it is debatable whether this common law rule might be used in
support of a claim for invasion of privacy.
A related issue is whether a violation of a federal criminal statute may
support a civil claim for invasion of privacy under Arkansas law. For example, in Cannady, three of the hospital’s employees pleaded guilty to a criminal violation of HIPAA for unlawfully viewing medical records and photographs of the plaintiff’s decedent.714 Thereafter, the decedent’s mother, on
her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter’s estate, filed suit against the
hospital for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.715 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the privacy claims, reasoning that a claim for invasion of privacy does not
survive the decedent, and the mother could not assert her own relational
700. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-102(c)(2) (Supp. 2011) (class D felony).
701. Id. § 5-16-101(a) (Supp. 2011).
702. Id. § 5-37-227(a) (Supp. 2011) (class C felony; class B felony if victim is elderly or
disabled).
703. Id. § 5-71-229(a) (Supp. 2011) (class B felony for first degree; class C felony for
second degree).
704. Id. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2006) (class B felony).
705. Id. § 5-39-201(b)(1) (class C felony).
706. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-201 (Supp. 2011) (class B or C felony).
707. Id. § 5-37-208 (Repl. 2006) (class D felony for first degree).
708. Id. § 5-41-103(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony).
709. Id. § 5-41-104(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony if violation causes loss or damage of
$2,500 or more).
710. Id. § 5-41-205(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony).
711. Id. § 5-41-206(a) (Repl. 2006) (class D felony if committed to devise or execute
scheme to defraud or illegally obtain property).
712. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-106(a) (Repl. 2006) (any computer-related crime in subchapter 1 of Chapter 41).
713. See ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 601, 901 (Ark. Supreme Court
Comm. on Jury Instructions 2013).
714. Cannady v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2012 Ark. 369, at 2, ___ S.W.3d ___.
715. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___.
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privacy claim based on the undeniable violation of the decedent’s privacy
interests.716
Because the defendant hospital’s employees pleaded guilty to a violation of HIPAA, that criminal conduct might have provided a basis for asserting a claim for invasion of privacy under the crime victims civil liability
statute, or perhaps even under common law.717 Arkansas courts have occasionally allowed a violation of a federal statute or regulation to be considered evidence of negligence.718 While the Arkansas courts have been lenient
in allowing fact finders to consider statutory violations as evidence of negligence, it is unclear whether they would do so in support of a claim for invasion of privacy.719
Thus, aside from the Arkansas statutes expressly authorizing civil
claims based upon conduct that would justify criminal prosecution, it remains an open question whether a defendant’s violation of a federal or state
statute may be considered in support of a tort claim for invasion of privacy.720
V. CONCLUSION
From its beginning in the early years of the twentieth century, privacy
law has been shaped and influenced by societal norms. As developments in
technology continue to enable widespread media publicity, electronic sur716. Id. at 8, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
717. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 (2012)
(“When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely on
the statute to decide that an affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope of the duty.”).
Both federal and state courts may rely on federal statutes or regulations to recognize an affirmative duty in tort law. When they do so, they are determining
state law, as there is no general federal common law. The use of a federal enactment to find a state-law affirmative duty is permissible so long as the federal
provision does not preempt state tort-law liability. The use of federal legislation
as the basis for finding an affirmative duty is, in this respect, analogous to a court
determining that violation of a federal provision constitutes negligence per se in
a tort case governed by state law.
Id. cmt. b.
718. See, e.g., Koch v. Northport Health Servs. of Ark., LLC, 361 Ark. 192, 207–08, 205
S.W.3d 754, 766 (2005) (dicta) (holding violations of federal nursing home regulations provided evidence of negligence, even if the regulations did not specifically govern the case
(citing Dunn v. Brimer, 259 Ark. 855, 537 S.W.2d 164 (1976))); Franco v. Bunyard, 261
Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1977) (holding violation of federal gun control laws was
sufficient evidence of negligence to preclude summary judgment).
719. A federal trial court has recently suggested rather cryptically that an alleged violation of a federal criminal statute does not apply to the Arkansas crime victims civil liability
statute. See LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 903 &
n.7 (E.D. Ark. 2011).
720. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 38.
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veillance, and instant global telecommunications, privacy interests and their
protections have claimed increasing public attention.
Arkansas was a relative latecomer to the field of privacy law, first acknowledging the state common law right of privacy in 1962. In the years
since, Arkansas courts have generally interpreted the common law right
consistent with the four distinct privacy torts identified and defined by the
American Law Institute in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Forty years
after recognizing the common law right, Arkansas was among the first to
interpret its state constitution to guarantee a fundamental right of privacy, at
least with respect to decision making about intimate consensual adult relationships.
The Arkansas Supreme Court continues to clarify the scope of the state
constitutional right, most recently interpreting it to ensure that households
with cohabiting unmarried couples are not categorically barred from serving
as foster parents.721 Whether the fundamental right of privacy implicit in the
Arkansas Constitution extends to informational privacy, procreational decision making, or other privacy interests remains to be seen.
While the Arkansas General Assembly has recently enacted several
criminal statutes to address concerns related to informational and computer
privacy, it is unclear whether the threat of criminal prosecution will sufficiently deter intrusive conduct. Arkansas statutes authorize civil claims to
redress injuries caused by felony violations, but this alternative appears to
be seldom used because no cases have reached the appellate courts.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has taken the lead in delineating the progressive state of privacy law in Arkansas. Yet challenging new issues are on
the horizon. Recent enactments of the Arkansas General Assembly restricting abortion rights will no doubt test the limits of the state constitutional
right of privacy. The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision holding
the federal statutory definition of marriage unconstitutional as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause raises important privacy-related
issues for Arkansas and other states with respect to defining the traditional
institution of marriage. Finally, the new Restatement (Third) of Torts is well
underway by the American Law Institute, which may suggest further opportunities for expanding the reach of privacy rights in Arkansas. Twenty years
from now, the evolving state of privacy law in Arkansas will no doubt call
for yet another update.

721. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 26, 380 S.W.3d 429, 443.

